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ABSTRACT
KEY FACTORS DRIVING PERSONNEL DOWNSIZING IN MULTINATIONAL
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
Ilksen Gorkem 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Co-Directors: Dr. Pilar Pazos 
Dr. Resit Unal
Although downsizing has long been a topic of research in traditional 
organizations, there are very few studies o f this phenomenon in military contexts. As a 
result, we have little understanding of the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in 
military settings. This study contributes to our understanding o f key factors that drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations and whether those factors may differ 
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The theoretical framework for this study was 
built from studies in non-military contexts and adapted to fit the military environment.
This research relies on historical data from one of the largest multinational 
coalition forces worldwide. Time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data from 28 
NATO countries over 23 years (1990-2012) were gathered. This data included the 
following variables: Total Active Duty Personnel number, Military Expenditure as a 
percentage o f GDP, turnover in the Chief of General Staff, and modification o f the 
National Military Strategy Directive. This study measures personnel downsizing as a 
reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel number in NATO nations’ military 
organizations. A series o f analyses using the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) one-step difference method with robust standard errors were conducted 
in two steps. For the first step, an inspection o f the key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing was performed using Stata xtabond’ estimation. For the second step, an
analysis o f whether or not the key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters 
was conducted.
The findings from this research contribute to the discipline of engineering 
management by providing a model to improve our understanding and ability to predict 
future personnel downsizing decisions and to increase our understanding o f military 
governance not only NATO wide but also worldwide. Differences found across cultural 
clusters make this study more noteworthy.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Although downsizing has been a topic of research for many years, the literature 
on downsizing is still developing. There are a few researchers trying to unlock the 
mystery of what drives downsizing in military organizations (Magan-Diaz & Cespedes- 
Lorente, 2012). Several theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted to 
investigate the causes o f this phenomenon in the academic realm (McKinley, Zhao, & 
Rust, 2000). Useem (1993) investigated the factors that drive downsizing and found that 
a change in leadership was associated to downsizing in personnel numbers. Likewise, 
Budros (1999) investigated the causes o f downsizing. It was estimated that downsizing 
rates were higher when CEOs had financial backgrounds than when they did not (Budros, 
1999). Bemardi (1996) found that downsizing decisions are heavily affected by political 
guidance.
Researchers have not yet agreed upon one definition for downsizing. Most 
scholars define downsizing as structural, functional, and personnel reduction aimed at 
improving the performance of an organization (Cameron, 1994; Cascio, 1993; DeWitt, 
1993; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; McKinley, Sanchez, & Schick, 1995). Prior research 
has argued that an organization’s desired performance level is often accomplished 
through personnel lay-offs (Cascio, 1993).
Armed forces around the world have gone through downsizing to increase 
performance by reducing functions, changing the work process, or reducing the 
hierarchical levels of their organizations (Cameron, 1994; DeWitt, 1993; Freeman &
2
Cameron, 1993). A number of NATO countries began military downsizing at the end of 
World War II, and the majority o f them downsized after the Cold War (Borch & Wallace, 
2010; The World Bank, 2014). After experiencing military downsizing during those 
periods, it is believed that a number of possible key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing may vary across NATO nations' cultural clusters. As an international 
alliance, NATO has 28 member nations which fall under different cultural clusters 
(Chnokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2009). This makes NATO a very appropriate context for 
studying the phenomenon of personnel downsizing from a multinational and multicultural 
perspective. The purpose of this study is to investigate key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing in NATO nations' military organizations (armed forces) and to determine 
whether those factors may differ across cultural clusters based on quantitative analysis of 
the data.
1.1 Background of the Problem
Changes in the external environment o f military organizations drive the need for 
organizational change and often result in downsizing (James, 2008). A number of NATO 
nations’ armed forces have been downsizing for several decades. For instance, Canada’s 
number o f active military personnel went from 88,000 in 1989 to 69,950 in 1999 and 
65,700 by the end o f 2010. France’s numbers were reduced from 554,000 in 1989 to 
332,250 in 2011 (The World Bank, 2014). It appears that there are certain key factors that 
drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations.
1.2 Problem Statement
It is critical for a military organization to provide an efficient workforce while 
optimizing personnel numbers. It is also imperative to understand that the problem of
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balancing resources and requirements is a big challenge (DAU, 2014). Scholars provide 
evidence o f a relationship between an organization’s budget (expenditure) and personnel 
downsizing (Prindle, 2005). The dynamics of downsizing affect all nations worldwide, 
and multinational coalitions such as NATO are critically affected by downsizing 
decisions at the national level (The World Bank, 2014). The U.S. defense budget for 2012 
was $645.7 billion, and military personnel spending made up 22% ($141.8 billion) of 
total spending (DoD, 2013c). The U.S. military personnel spending was more than 
China’s total defense budget ($102.4 billion) and twice Russia’s total ($59.9 billion) 
(Heeley, 2013).
Although scholars have investigated some o f the factors that drive downsizing in 
organizations, a systematic literature search did not yield any research study exploring 
the contextual factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations 
(Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Beaulier, Hall, & Lynch, 2011; Brannen, 2005; Budros, 
1999; Cameron & Freeman, 1994 ; Cascio, 1993; Franko, 1994; Magan-Dlaz & 
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012; Useem, 1993). There are very few studies in military contexts, 
and those that exist generally examine the effects of downsizing in military organizations 
(Cascio, Young, & Morris, 1997; Castro, 2013; Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010; 
DeWitt, 1993; Lewis, 2013; Prindle, 2005; Sronce, 2003). As a result, we have little 
understanding of the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military settings and 
whether those factors differ across cultural clusters. The theoretical framework for this 
study was built on studies conducted in non-military contexts and then adapted to 
characteristics o f the military environment. This research proposes a model to identify the 
key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations.
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1.3 Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative study is to investigate key factors that might drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations and whether those 
factors may differ across cultural clusters. For the purpose o f this study, the definition of 
downsizing is limited to personnel downsizing in the military organizations o f 28 NATO 
nations. Any reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel o f a nation was considered 
personnel downsizing.
The quantitative correlational research design was selected because it allows the 
researcher to study the relationship between possible key factors and active duty 
personnel downsizing across multicultural military organizations. The purpose of the 
research design is to determine to what extent the independent variables (Military 
Expenditure, turnover in the Chief of General Staff, and modification o f the National 
Military Strategy Directive) predict the dependent variable (Total Active Duty Personnel 
number).
1.4 Research Questions
The questions for this descriptive research are stated below:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military 
organizations of NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
1.5 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual model based on the literature review is shown in Figure 1. The 
model was constructed to investigate the relationship between Personnel Downsizing (Y) 
and Military Expenditure (Xi), turnover in the Chief of General Staff (X2), and
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modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive (X3). It was also constructed to 
determine whether those relationships differ across NATO nations' cultural clusters.
Y = f ( X , , X 2, X 3)
where (Y) is personnel downsizing in military organizations, (Xi) is Military 
Expenditure, (X2) is turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and (X3) is modification o f the 
National Military Strategy Directive.
Figure 1. Conceptual Model
1.6 Operational Definitions
Operational definitions used throughout this study are provided below:
• Downsizing: This study defines downsizing as a percentage o f active duty 
personnel reduction in the military organizations o f 28 NATO nations
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within a given period. Any reduction in the number of Total Active Duty 
Personnel qualifies as personnel downsizing.
• Total Active Duty Personnel: Total Active Duty Personnel is the total 
number o f personnel in a given national military organization (armed 
forces) within NATO. The number includes only those that have a “full­
time occupation as part o f a military organization, including paramilitary 
forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they 
may be used to support or replace regular military forces" (The World 
Bank, 2014, p. 1).
• Military Expenditure (% of GDP): “Military Expenditure is all costs 
incurred as a result o f current military activities of a NATO nation"
(S1PRI, 2014, p. 1). Military Expenditure is the percentage o f GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) o f each NATO nation.
• Chief of General Staff: The Chief of General Staff is the person in 
command/lead of all the forces in a NATO nation’s military organization 
(DoD, 2010).
• Turnover in Chief of General Staff: Turnover in the Chief of General 
Staff is the year when transfer o f authority takes place from the current 
Chief o f General Staff to his/her successor.
• Tenure of Chief of General Staff: Tenure o f the Chief of General Staff is 
the number o f years that the Chief o f General Staff has been on duty.
• National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD): The National Military 
Strategy Directive is an official document used for allocating military
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power to reach a level o f ambition directed by a national security strategy 
(DoD, 2010). NMSD is published periodically by each nation in the 
coalition. Publication frequency differs across NATO nations (e.g. 
annually, bi-annually, etc.).
• Modification of National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD): 
Modification of NMSD stands for the year when a newer version of 
NMSD is published.
• National Military Strategy Directive Maturity: National Military 
Strategy Directive maturity is the period o f time that the NMSD has been 
in effect.
• Cultural Clusters: Cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar 
cultural characteristics (House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this study, 28 
NATO countries are grouped according to their cultural clusters.
• Military Organization: Military organizations in this study include the 
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard (DoD, 2010). 
Military organizational structure may change from nation to nation. The 
term 'Military Organization’ is synonymous with the term ‘armed forces,’ 
and it includes organizations from each of the 28 NATO nations.
• NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international 
alliance that consists of 28 member states from North America and Europe 
founded in 1949. These member states include the twelve founding 
members of the alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
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Kingdom, and the United States (NATO, 2013, August 20). The remaining 
members and their membership dates are: “Greece-Turkey (1952), 
Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic-Hungary-Poland 
(1999), Bulgaria-Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania-Romania-Slovakia-Slovenia 
(2004) and Albania-Croatia (2009)” (NATO, 2013, August 20, p. 1).
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Gross domestic product (GDP) is 
defined as the overall market value of all the final goods and services 
produced by a nation within a given year (Argandona, 2008, p. 1043).
• Year: Data collected for this study was acquired from 28 NATO countries 
from 1990 through 2012 (for a total span o f 23 years).
1.7 Assumptions
The data gathered for this study reflects the true value for NATO nations’ military 
organizations. The modified cultural clusters o f NATO nations reflect reality. This study 
assumes that the data collected is accurate. Several sources were utilized for triangulation 
with the aim to reduce possible errors in data sources.
1.8 Significance of the Study
There are very few published studies o f military downsizing, and no prior studies 
were found that investigate the key factors that might drive personnel downsizing in 
NATO nations’ military organizations and whether those factors may differ across 
NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The findings contribute to engineering management and 
military governance by providing a model to help leadership in military coalitions 
understand the critical factors driving strategic human resource decisions. This study is a 
unique example in military settings that provides a new perspective to military
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downsizing. Coalition forces rely on resources from all partnering organizations to 
accomplish their mission. Human resource management decisions made by each partner 
have implications for the rest o f the coalition. Those decisions are often driven by 
different factors. In particular, characteristics o f the national culture are known to affect 
the decision making process. This study specifically explores the role that national 
culture characteristics play on personnel downsizing decisions and whether the factors 
driving those decisions might differ across cultural clusters. This study makes a 
significant contribution to our understanding o f strategic human resource management in 
multinational military settings by identifying the most significant antecedents of 
downsizing.
1.9 Reduction of Gaps
Although some researchers have studied downsizing and its effects on military 
organizations, there is still a gap in the literature concerning the factors that drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations. A systematic review o f the literature did 
not yield any published studies addressing this topic. There could be unpublished studies 
that address this subject, but no previous research was found in the form o f scholarly 
publications or publicly shared documents. Therefore, a gap remains unfilled in this area. 
In addition, there is no previous study on how influential factors may differ across NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters. This study reduces the gaps in this area o f study by identifying 
and examining the factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations and 




2.1 Definition of Downsizing
Downsizing is sometimes used as a synonym for decline, but they are two 
different terms. Downsizing is typically aimed at improving efficiency while a decline 
typically is naturally occurring and has no aim o f improving efficiency. Decline is the 
result o f a combination o f organizational factors and environment (Freeman & Cameron, 
1993). Downsizing may be performed by reducing functions, changing the work process, 
or reducing hierarchal levels without reducing the total number o f personnel (Cameron, 
1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). Downsizing is a set of managerial actions aimed at 
producing a more efficient, productive, and competitive organization. It may be executed 
by reducing workers (Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). According to Cascio 
(1993) “downsizing is a popular strategy” (p. 97). It is also a managerial reduction in 
resources, including human power, to realign and increase the performance level of an 
organization when it faces a decline in performance (DeWitt, 1993). Downsizing is aimed 
at gaining economic and organizational benefits (Cascio, 1993; McKinley et al., 1995). It 
is a tool used by many organizations to remain competitive (McCune, Beatty, & 
Montagno, 1988). This method results in increased productivity while at the same time 
utilizing fewer funds. Downsizing aims to be more productive by reducing cost via 
performing Total Quality Management techniques such as reengineering the logistics 
process. In this content, the logistics system of an organization is inspected, and cost- 
increasing sub-phases are omitted by reengineering to reduce overall logistics related cost
(Thomchick, Young, & Grenoble, 1999). Downsizing is a firm 's reaction to a changing 
business environment (Thomchick et al., 1999). It is an intentional action executed 
proactively, reactively or creatively (Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993; Mishra 
& Mishra, 1994). Downsizing is a radical change in an organization since it may also 
change the processes or activities employees were accustomed to (Budros, 1999).
Downsizing means not only a reduction in resources, including the total number 
of employees but also a redesigning and restructuring o f an organization to be more 
effective and productive. For many companies, downsizing means a reduction in 
personnel quantity rather than a systemic organizational redesign and may include a 
modification of the organization to improve its efficiency (Cascio, 1993). During the 
period from 1989 through 1991, around 1,000 American companies eliminated 212,598 
jobs reportedly saving $ 8  billion per year (Cascio, 1993). It is likely that downsizing will 
continue in American companies in the foreseeable future (Hanaoka, 1997).
Downsizing is not without consequences. The findings o f a research study 
conducted among Fortune 100 companies that downsized between 1987 and 1998 
showed that downsized companies were worse in economic performance than the 3 5  
companies that did not downsize (De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden, & Roraff, 2004). 
Consequently, after a downsizing action, the remaining personnel must assume the 
responsibilities o f the personnel that were let go, which generally leads to overload 




With the understanding that military organizations can become more effective and 
productive, it is possible for downsizing to be implemented in almost the same manner in 
military as in non-military organizations. Downsizing approaches are thought to increase 
performance by reducing functions, changing the work process, or reducing the 
hierarchical levels of a military organization (Cameron, 1994; DeWitt, 1993; Freeman & 
Cameron, 1993). Military downsizing is largely driven by changes in the security 
environment (Thomchick et al., 1999). After World War II, the United States Army 
downsized from 8,267,958 to 1,070,000 by mid-1947 (Taylor, Olson, & Schrader, 1981). 
As a reaction to the changing security environment during the Cold War, the United 
States’ total active duty personnel number reached 1,459,000 in 1950. During the Korean 
War (June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953), in which the United States was involved, the number 
o f active duty personnel reached 3,636,000 in 1952 (Daggett & Belasco, 2002). During 
the period following the Korean War, the United States armed forces downsized to 
2,600,000 by 1958. Although the aforementioned examples are referring to military 
downsizing as personnel downsizing, there are other examples o f restructuring efforts in 
military organizations. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) closed more 
than 60 bases during the 1960s (Beaulier et al., 2011). During the period from 1988 to 
2001, the U.S. Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) closed 125 major 
military facilities, 225 minor facilities, and then realigned 145 other bases (Beaulier et al., 
2011). Due to these closures, 15,874 civil service employees would have been fired, but 
by implementing several types o f transition programs (Job Placement Programs, the 
Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments,
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Transfer o f Function, etc.) fewer employees were affected by the BRAC program (Brass, 
2006). Turkey inactivated four o f its Army Brigades in 2004 (Gurel, 2004). Starting in 
2011, Germany reorganized its military organization into response forces and 
stabilization/support forces to be able to manage the need to be more deployable 
(Business Monitor International, 2011).
Military downsizing is a strategic redesign to adapt to a changing security 
environment aimed at increasing readiness for foreseeable missions, optimizing the entire 
organization, and increasing performance levels by reducing personnel numbers, bases, 
facilities, or by enhancing the hierarchical organization, the work process, equipment, 
and weapon systems (Cameron, 1994; Cameron & Freeman, 1994 ; Cascio, 1993; 
McCune et al., 1988; McKinley et al., 1995; Thomchick et al., 1999).
2.3 Downsizing Theory
There are three theoretical perspectives on downsizing: the economic, the 
institutional, and the sociocognitive, as shown in Table 1 (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). 
The economic theory states that economic reasons drive downsizing, while the 
institutional theory suggests that sociological reasons are responsible for downsizing. The 
sociocognitive theory posits that managerial decisions are the major driving forces behind 
downsizing decisions. Each theory describes the phenomenon of downsizing from a 
different perspective and identifies the key factors influencing it.
2.3.1 The Economic Theory
The key assumptions o f the economic perspective are that “firms are rational, 
self-interest seeking, and efficiency driven. Managerial actions and their outcomes are 
tightly connected, and managers understand those connections” (McKinley et al., 2000, p.
14
229). The economic theory states that the need to be more productive and efficient results 
in downsizing (Freeman & Cameron, 1993).
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2.3.2 The Institutional Theory
Researchers in opposition to the economic theory think that the needs originating 
from social life drive downsizing. They call this perspective the institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 2003). They refer to it as “coercive isomorphism,'’ (p. 157) which
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means managers see downsizing decisions as their legitimate rights. In this theory, career 
rewards and professional interaction drive downsizing (McKinley et al., 1995). The 
institutional theory supposes that society considers downsizing an institutional norm that 
leads them to downsize in order to achieve so-called legitimacy (Magan-Diaz & 
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012).
The key assumptions of the institutional perspective are that “organizational 
change arises from conformity to institutional rules as well as an internal impetus for 
efficiency. Managerial actions and their outcomes are loosely connected, and managers 
experience uncertainty about those connections” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). 
According to the institutional theory, “firms downsize in order to gain legitimacy and 
reduce uncertainty. Downsizing is driven by coercive, mimetic, and normative 
isomorphism” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229).
2.3,3 The Sociocognitive Theory
The key assumptions of the Sociocognitive Perspective are that “boundedly 
rational managers impose schemas on information environments. Managers make 
decisions based on those schemas, which often become reified through social 
construction processes” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). According to the Sociocognitive 
Theory, “managers’ decisions to downsize are based on shared mental models that define 
downsizing as effective. These mental models are social interaction and connected 
enactment processes” (McKinley et al., 2000, p. 229). The sociocognitive perspective 
focuses attention on managerial mental models. Based on this theory socially constructed 
shared schemas emerge among managers leading them to believe that downsizing will 
lead them to better economic performance (McKinley et al., 2000). They choose to
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downsize because they believe that this strategy will be successful. In addition, cultural 
diversity may affect organizations, since organizations might have managers from 
different cultures (O'Neill, Pouder, & Buchholtz, 1998).
2.3.4 Other Theories
There are a number o f more recent theoretical studies in the downsizing literature 
such as the Resources Theory, which suggests that changes in resources (budget, human 
power, etc.) lead to downsizing (Fisher & White, 2000). According to another theory 
called the Agency Theory, downsizing is heavily affected by “industry-specific factors 
and downsizing is positively associated with outside, non-institutional shareholding” 
(Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000, p. 300). Finally, Bhattacharyya and Chatterjee 
(2005) classified the reasons behind organizational downsizing by looking at it from 
different perspectives, including “economic, institutional, strategic, ideological, and 
arational perspectives” (p. 65).
2.4 Military Structures
The ever-changing security environment o f the world is requiring new kinds of 
missions and new military organizations to fulfill these new requirements (Krepinevich, 
1996). With this in mind, almost every NATO nation possesses a military structure to 
execute missions that need to adapt to fulfill a dynamic purpose. For instance, the 
structure of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is approximately a combination o f the 
Office of the Secretary o f Defense, the Department o f the Army, the Department o f the 
Navy (The Navy, The Marine Corps), the Department o f the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs 
o f Staff, and nine Combatant Commands. The Secretary o f Defense is the head of the 
DoD while the Secretaries o f the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force function as
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senior leaders for those organizations (DoD, 2014). Therefore, in the United States, 
politicians and civilians are heavily involved in the organizational structure and decision­
making process.
The Turkish military has a different structure directed by generals rather than by 
politicians and/or civilians. There is no civilian senior leader in the Turkish General Staff. 
The General acts as the chief of the Turkish armed forces and reports directly to the 
Prime Minister rather than the Secretary o f Defense. Under the command o f the Turkish 
General Staff, there are the Army, the Navy, the Air, the Gendarmerie, and the 
Coastguard commandants (Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May 22).
The German Federal Defense is a combination of two parts, which are military 
and civilian. A general commands the military branch (the General is also the chief of 
staff and the military advisor to the government), which consists o f the Army, the Navy, 
the Air Force, the Joint Support Service, and the Joint Medical Service. The Federal 
Minister o f Defense leads the civilian branch and also acts as the commander-in-chief of 
the German armed forces (Bundeswehr, 2011).
As an example o f the detailed organizational structure o f a military organization, 
a diagram of the U.S. Army operational unit is illustrated in Figure 2.
(3 / Brigadier OaeraW 'olonrl)
(3 or more / Lknteaaat Coionri- 
Major)
Figure 2. The U.S. Army Organizational Structure [Adapted from (US Army, 2014)]
A general (four star / ★ ★ ★ ★) commands a field army, which consists o f two to 
five corps. A lieutenant general (★ ★ ★) commands a corps, which consists of two to five 
divisions. A major general (★ ★) commands a division, which consists of three brigades 
(10,000-18,000 soldiers). A brigadier general (★)/colonel commands a brigade, which 
consists o f three or more battalions (3,000-5,000 soldiers). A lieutenant colonel/major 
commands a battalion, which consists o f three to five companies (500-600 soldiers). A 
captain commands a company, which consists of three to four platoons (100-200 
soldiers). A first lieutenant/lieutenant commands a platoon, which consists o f three to 
four squads (16-40 soldiers). A staff sergeant commands a squad, which has four to ten 
soldiers (US Army, 2014).
19
2.5 Defense Planning
Military organizations must decide on the right design concerning missions, 
structure, budget, personnel, and all other resources. A NATO member nation's armed 
forces use many different kinds o f defense systems. For example, the United States' 
weapon systems are classified into 12 main branches: space systems, aircraft, land 
systems, ships, smart weapons, aircraft systems, dumb bombs, naval combat systems, 
missiles, nuclear systems, missile defense, and intelligence systems. Each branch has 
many different sub-branches. For instance, Land Warfare Systems consists of direct fire, 
indirect fire, command, combat support, and combat service support sub-branches. Sub­
branches are separated by the specifications of the systems, which include tracked, 
wheeled, towed, crew served, individual, munitions, defense/countermeasures, 
communications, command, control, intelligence, and other equipment. Finally, they are 
labeled by names such as Ml Abrams tank, M998 Truck-HMMWV (High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle), Ml 15 (8 in / 203 mm) howitzer, FIM-92A stinger 
weapons systems, M12A2 5.56 mm semiautomatic rifle, hand grenades, uniforms, 
radiological defense systems, joint tactical radio system, and MRE (Meal, Ready to Eat, 
Individual) (Federation of American Scientists, 2014). As in land systems, aircraft and 
aircraft systems, as well as navy and all other warfare systems, have sub-branches down 
to the system names. Some of the United States’ aircraft warfare systems are: A-10A, F- 
15C, F-16C, B-52H, C-130H, and HH-60G.
All warfare systems are subject to the effects o f aging, and they need to be 
replaced by newer models by using military funds. Some of the United States’ aircraft
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with average ages between 18.2 (HH-60G) and 46.7 years (B-52H) needed to be replaced 
(Data as o f 30 August 2008) (Coggins, 2010).
Military organizations, along with their organizational structures and defense 
systems, are located on bases and other facilities. The U.S. military has almost 550,000 
buildings and facilities that support its operations and combat readiness (Miles, 2013).
The U.S. DoD announced the closing o f 21 minor or non-operational military facilities in 
Europe hoping to save $60 million annually (Tilghman, 2014, May 23). Buildings and 
facilities also age, and they need to be replaced or renovated via the military budget.
2.6 Military Expenditure
Keeping combat ready military organizations for a nation is an expensive 
necessity. Nations are training their militaries to protect their population, homeland, 
resources, and their national honor. In order to be able to execute the aforementioned 
missions, governments allocate money as part of their defense budgets or military 
expenditures (Coggins, 2010). There is no agreed international definition for military 
expenditure. According to Heeley (2013), world nations spent approximately $1,582.8 
billion ($1.58 trillion) in 2012 as military expenditure. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2013), world military spending in 2012 
was estimated to be $1,756 billion. The U.S. defense budget for 2012 was $645.7 billion 
(4.12% of its GDP), which was two times more than all o f the countries in Asia, six times 
more than China (1.24% of its GDP), and 11 times more than Russia (3.06% of its GDP). 
The U.S. accounted for 41% of worldwide military spending. On the other hand, Iraq 
spent 11.28% of its GDP, which was $14.7 billion, and Afghanistan spent 10.54% of its
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GDP ($2.1 billion) while some NATO nations spent less. For example, Canada spent 
only 1.04%, Italy spent 1.19%, and Germany spent 1.20% of their GDPs (Heeley, 2013).
National instabilities may have an effect on military expenditures. The United 
States military expenditure remarkably increased during the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, and the First Gulf War (Coggins, 2010). However, the possible effects o f national 
instability periods on the data were out of the scope of this study.
With so many requirements and missions, defense budgets need to be allocated 
efficiently. The U.S. defense budget allocation for 2012 is shown in Table 2. The defense 
budget must be allocated to military personnel spending, operation, maintenance, 
procurement, research, development, military construction, family housing, testing, 
evaluation, etc. Operation and maintenance together with military personnel spending 
make up more than half (52.5%) o f total spending.
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Table 2. The U.S. DoD FY2012 Defense Budget Allocation [Adapted from (DoD,
2013c)]
US DoD FY2012 Spending: 





Military Personnel 141,819 22
Operation and Maintenance 197,198 30.5
Procurement 104,464 16.2
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 71,375 11.1
Military Construction 11,367 1.8
Family Housing 1,683 0.3
Revolving and Management Funds 2,641 0.4
Subtotal, Discretionary base budget authority 530,547 82.2
Discretionary Cap Adjustment / Overseas Contingency 
Operations (OCO) 115,083 17.8
Total, Discretionary budget authority (Base and 
OCO) 645,630
It is difficult to decide how to allocate a defense budget. A model for the defense 
budget allocation process is illustrated in Figure 3. Ammunition, fuel, and contracted 
services are considered disposable; warfare systems, infrastructures, and 
research/development/testing/evaluation are considered an investment. The main goal of 
allocation is to maximize military capabilities by considering budget constraints and 
expenditures in order to maintain a military strength that is capable o f executing current 
and foreseeable missions (Stone, 2004).
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CONSTRAINT EXPENDITURES INPUTS FORCES OUTPUTS
Figure 3. Defense Budget Allocation Process [Adapted from (Stone, 2004, p. 126)]
Keeping in mind that U.S. operation, maintenance, and personnel spending are 
52.5% of total spending, allocation must be optimized in order to have a modernized and 
mission-ready military power. If a military budget is not enough to reach the desired 
capabilities, which is also called the ’Level of Ambition’ in military terms, then a 
reduction in personnel, investment, operations and maintenance expenditures may be 
needed. One o f the ways to reduce expenditures is through downsizing. The U.S. DoD 
estimated a savings of $200 billion between FY2012 and FY2017 by “paring back excess 
staff, headquarters structures (including a 4-star ‘combatant command'), General and
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Flag Officers, senior civilian executives, and duplication in information technology, 
intelligence, public affairs, and facilities” (DoD, 2013a, p. 2). The U.S. DoD planned to 
save $1.9 billion by cancelling ‘the precision tracking space sensor’ in FY2014. They 
also estimated that if the sequestration continues as planned, they would save $50 billion 
each year through FY2021 (DoD, 2013a). The U.S. DoD saved $17 billion by closing 
125 major and 225 minor military facilities from 1988 to 2001 (Beaulier et al., 2011).
2.7 Chief of General Staff
The Chief of General Staff is the person in overall command of all forces in a 
NATO nation’s military organization (DoD, 2010). NATO countries have different 
command structures, but almost every nation has a commander who leads its armed 
forces or national military organization. Turkey uses the title the chief of general staff 
(Turkish Armed Forces, 2014, May 22), the U.S. uses the title chairman of the joint 
chiefs o f staff (Feickert, 2014), Germany uses the title chief o f federal armed forces staff 
or general inspector o f the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr, 2011), and France uses the title 
chief o f the defence staff (French MOD, 2013). In Latvia, the chief o f defense leads the 
armed forces (DCAF, 2003). There is no common name for the aforementioned top 
commanders, but in this study, the term ‘chief o f general staff is used to refer to the 
highest-ranking officer of a nation’s armed forces. The chief o f general staff makes 
strategic decisions for redesign/restructuring during his/her tenure. His/her critical role 
changes from nation to nation. The Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Yasar 
Buyukanit (2006-2008), announced in 2006 that the Turkish land forces would gradually 
shrink by 20-30% as a part of a strategic force plan called Kuvvet-2014 (Force-2014). 
Kuvvet-2014 successfully began its execution by disbanding the 15th Corps (Hurriyet
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Daily News, 2006). Nevertheless, during the command of his successors, the 
implementation o f the plan had lost its momentum. The U.S. Chairman o f the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, General John Shalikashvili, established the ‘Joint 
Vision 2010’ transformation program, which aimed to increase the effectiveness of the 
digitalization o f the U.S. military (Shalikashvili, 1997). The U.S. Chairman o f the Joint 
Chiefs o f Staff from 2007 to 2011, Admiral Michael Glenn Mullen, stated his views on 
the use o f military force in a speech at Kansas University (Chu-Jeff, 2010, May 1). 
According to the economic and sociocognitive perspectives o f downsizing, managers 
play a prominent role in downsizing decisions (McKinley, 2000). As a result, 
replacement o f top military leadership is expected to have a significant impact on 
downsizing. This research examines whether changes in the Chief o f General Staff might 
be a factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2.8 National Military Strategy Directive
The National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD) is an official paper for 
distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national 
defense strategy objectives (DoD, 2010). It is often used to turn the National Security 
Strategy into a directive from which the armed forces could develop their defense 
program including redesigning, enhancing, digitizing, and modernizing (Fast, 2010). The 
NMSD is published periodically. Publication periods across NATO countries differ from 
nation to nation (e.g. annually, bi-annually and so on). The NMSD generally describes 
the security environment while outlining details regarding what the armed forces should 
do to accomplish their mission in that environment. It also defines military capabilities 
and the means necessary to reach those capabilities (DoD, 2010). The U.S. National
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Military Strategy is reviewed February 15th o f every even-numbered year (US GAO, 
1993). The national military strategy directives lead the way in restructuring, which may 
end in downsizing decisions. The U.S. national military strategy directive that was 
published in 1997 directed the U.S. forces to begin a transformation process to be more 
capable and flexible (Metz, 2006). Norway changes its national military strategy every 
four years (Global Security, 2014c). Modification to the National Military Strategy 
Directives might be a factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2,9 Total Active Duty Personnel
Total Active Duty Personnel is the total number o f personnel in the armed forces 
of a nation who have “full-time occupation as part o f a military organization, including 
paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may 
be used to support or replace regular military forces” (The World Bank, 2014, p. 1). The 
number o f Active Duty Military Personnel determines how much a government should 
pay out o f its military budget for military personnel. In 2007, the U.S. active duty 
military personnel cost 23% o f the defense budget with a total o f $96,761 billion spent 
(Peccia, 2008). In 2012, it was 22% with a total o f $141,819 billion (DoD, 2013c). Some 
o f the active duty personnel expenditures are for social security, Medicare, Medicaid, etc. 
(Peccia, 2008). This takes into consideration that high cost military organizations 
frequently reduce the number o f active duty personnel. The U.S. Army reduced its 
personnel number from 790,000 to 520,000 from 1990 through 1995; this reduction 
included officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and junior enlisted soldiers 
(Evans, 1995). Germany reduced its active duty personnel from around 250,000 to
180,000 in 2010 (Business Monitor International, 2011).
27
2.10 Needs for Downsizing
In 2013, the U.S. Congress prompted the military to reduce military expenditures 
over the next 10 years with the potential for further cuts in the future (Blechman & 
Eaglen, 2013). When an organization begins downsizing, it may continue for many years. 
For instance, Kodak redesigned its structure four times in 10 years, Honeywell downsized 
two times in four years, and many other major companies acted similarly through the 
1990s (Cascio, 1993). Environmental factors are major drivers o f organizational change 
often leading to redesign and downsizing initiatives (James, 2008). If the goal of an 
organization is to increase its efficiency and competitiveness, it will shrink the level of 
managerial structures to try to be more productive with fewer resources, and the 
organization often performs downsizing to achieve this goal (Gandolfi, 2014). Some 
firms prefer to downsize to reduce cost and to gain economic efficiency (Magan-Diaz & 
Cespedes-Lorente, 2012). Sometimes a change in market conditions, such as a reduced 
customer demand for certain products, might lead to personnel downsizing (Conway, 
2004). Surprisingly, personnel downsizing has been performed by firms in a healthy 
state, such as Frito Lay and GTE, in addition to firms in a fragile state, such as General 
Motors and IBM (Bruton, Keels, & Shook, 1996). Preemptive strategic thinking might 
also result in personnel downsizing in organizations even if such companies are at their 
economic peaks (Budros, 2000).
In non-military contexts, causes o f personnel downsizing can also be categorized 
as external (macro-environmental factors) and internal (organizational factors). In order 
to identify potential key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military settings, the 
factors in civilian contexts were used and adapted to military settings. The last columns
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of Table 3 and Table 4, state the possible military key factors derived from Cooper, 
Pandey, & Quick’s (2012) study. External factors of personnel downsizing and possible 
external military key factors are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. External Factors o f Personnel Downsizing and Possible External Military
Key Factors [Adapted from (Cooper et al., 2012, p. 66)J
External -  Civilian 
Factors
External -  Military Factors Possible External Military 
Key Factors
Declines in customer 
demands
Declines in level of ambition National Military Strategy 
Directive
Industry deregulation / 
privatization
Anticipated changes in the 
security environment
National Military Strategy 
Directive
Anticipated changes in 
the economic 
environment















National Military Strategy 
Directive
Globalization / global 
competition
Changes in the security 
environment
National Military Strategy 
Directive
Differences in regional 
labor costs
Differences among NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters, 
differences in costs
Military Expenditure 
(Factors may differ across 
cultural clusters)











Using information technology 
in office works, modernization, 
buying new warfare systems
Material (Modernization, 
New Warfare Systems and  
Information Technologies)
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Internal factors of personnel downsizing and possible internal military key factors and 
internal factors are displayed in Table 4.
Table 4. Internal Factors of Personnel Downsizing and Possible Internal Military 
Key Factors [Adapted from (Cooper et al., 2012, p. 66)]
Internal -  Civilian 
Factors
Internal -  Military Factors Possible Internal Military 
Key Factors
Horizontal mergers / 
acquisitions
Structural, hierarchical order 
acquisitions o f military 
organization
Organization (Structure /  





Corporate governance practices Military Expenditure
CEO demographic 
characteristics
Chief o f General Staff 
demographic characteristics
C hief o f  General S ta ff
Human resources 
practices
Active Duty Personnel 
practices
N /  A (Related to Total Active 
Duty Personnel)
2.11 Downsizing Decisions and Roles
Downsizing typically consists o f a top-down driven set of managerial actions 
(Cameron, 1994; Freeman & Cameron, 1993). However, it has been observed that 
interventions are more effective when lower and mid-level employees are involved in the 
implementation initiative (Cameron, 1994). Downsizing decisions are affected by 
environmental (external) and organizational (internal) factors (Datta et al., 2010). 
Building consensus on downsizing decisions with stakeholders is important (Pratzel &
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Morton, 2009). However, downsizing decisions are generally unilateral and stand on the 
shoulder o f the leaders, managers, CEOs, or Chiefs o f General Staff (Prindle, 2005). 
According to Gardner (2002), “budgets and politics have directly contributed to 
downsizing decisions o f the Post-Cold War period’* (p. 41). In NATO nations’ armed 
forces, the Chief o f General Staff is thought to play a key role in downsizing decisions. 
The role of the Chief o f General Staff might also have different prominence depending on 
the country under consideration.
As illustrated in Figure 4, the U.S. National Security Strategy addresses the geo­
political/geo-economic space o f the U.S. Government, and it considers national interests, 
goals, and priorities (Hesterman, 2014). The U.S. National Defense Strategy outlines the 
political military space from the perspective of the U.S. Department o f Defense - for how 









































♦ Strategic and Military Risk Assessments
* Regional Assessments_____________________
Armed Forces
Figure 4. Linking National Security Strategy to National Military Strategy [Adapted
from (Hesterman, 2014, p. 3))
The U.S. national military strategy, prepared for military-operational space by the 
U.S. armed forces, consists of national military objectives, missions, tasks and end states, 
desired capabilities and attributes, priorities, strategic and military risk assessments and 
regional assessments (Hesterman, 2014).
In the United States, Defense Planning/Programming Guidance (DPG) directs the 
planning phase o f the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) Process
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(AcqNotes, 2014; DAU, 2014). The DPG is guided by the National Security Strategy, the 
National Military Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy (AcpNotes, 2014). The 
PPBE process declares how to distribute the resources o f the U.S. DoD (DAU, 2014). In 
the planning phase, strategic priorities and capabilities are defined. In the programming 
phase, priorities and capabilities are matched with the resources needed in order to 
achieve the strategic priorities. During the budgeting phase, funding for the programs is 
planned and justified, and an execution plan is created. In the execution phase, the 
approved plan is implemented (AcqNotes, 2014; DAU, 2014).
In 2012, the United States spent 22% of the U.S. DoD budget on military 
personnel. Spending on operation and maintenance accounted for 30.5%, procurement 
accounted for 16.2%, and research development/testing/evaluation accounted for 11.1% 
(DoD, 2013c). The difficulty o f the decision regarding how to allocate the defense budget 
in the armed forces has been largely acknowledged.
Integration for 
a  Resource M  
I  Balance f l
Figure 5. Resource Balancing [Adapted from (AcqNotes, 2014, p. 19)]
As illustrated in Figure 5, being able to achieve the correct level of resources, the 
correct prioritization, and program tradeoffs with the correct amount o f risk can be 
reached by balancing among and between manpower, investments, and military readiness 
(AcqNotes, 2014). If there are not enough resources to reach the planned capabilities, a 
cut-off point is needed in accordance with the priorities. Figure 6 illustrates the difficulty 
o f allocating a budget while trying to decide courses of action in the programming phase. 
Since the budget is limited but requirements are not, the requirements need to be 
prioritized in order to use the budget wisely. Prioritization o f the requirements and 
















Figure 6. From Programming to Budgeting [Adapted from (AcqNotes, 2014, p. 15)]
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Some possible courses o f action include: cancelling a warfare system project in 
force application, force support, and battlespace awareness echelons; cancelling the 
purchase o f newer fighter jets, tanks, warships, helicopters, etc.; cancelling planned 
construction; and reducing the number o f Total Active Duty Personnel (AcqNotes, 2014). 
Outputs to the programming phase are reconsidered for optimal budget planning.
A nation must perfectly align its requirements and match them with the available 
resources based on the budget and national military strategy. If the military organization 
of a nation with shrinking economies continues to ask for a larger military budget, then 
the nation’s economy may be severely damaged. For instance, during the mid-1980s, 
Brazil increased its expenditures in military power despite a shrinking economy, resulting 
in reduced economic growth (Franko, 1994).
According to previous studies, personnel downsizing is typically considered a 
reduction in the number o f permanent employees o f five percent or more compared to the 
previous year (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Cascio et al., 1997). In military 
organizations, a reduction o f 5% can result in great vulnerability. The impact in terms of 
actual reduction in personnel numbers can be huge in countries with a large military 
force. For instance, in 2012 China had 2,993,000 active duty military personnel (5% 
equals to 149,650), India had 2,728,700 (5% equals to 136,435), Russia had 1,364,000 
(5% equals to 68,200), and the United States had 1,492,200 (5% equals to 74,610) (The 
World Bank, 2014). In the same year, several NATO nations had fewer active duty 
military personnel than 5% of China’s total (149,650). For example, the Netherlands had 
43,300, Belgium had 30,700, Czech Republic had 26,750, and Norway had 25,800 total 
active duty personnel (The World Bank, 2014). For the purpose o f this study, any
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reduction in the number o f Total Active Duty Personnel is considered personnel 
downsizing.
2.12 Key Factors That Drive Personnel Downsizing
Military downsizing is often used as a strategic redesign strategy in order to adapt 
to a changing security environment. Downsizing decisions are typically aimed at 
increasing readiness for foreseeable missions, optimizing the entire organization, and 
increasing performance levels by reducing personnel numbers, bases, and facilities, or by 
enhancing the hierarchical organization, the work process, equipment, and weapon 
systems. The possible key factors that drive personnel downsizing were borrowed from 
previous studies done in non-military contexts and adapted to fit a military environment.
2.12.1 Chief of General Staff
The personality traits and backgrounds o f CEOs have been found to influence 
downsizing in personnel numbers (Useem, 1993). It has been found that downsizing rates 
were higher when CEOs had financial backgrounds than when they did not (Budros, 
1999). Additionally, changes in top military management (Chiefs o f General Staff) might 
also drive downsizing in military organizations depending on the leader’s personality, 
background, and experience. In academic literature, it has been proposed that CEO 
turnover may cause organizational dislocation and instability in personnel structure (Li, 
2012). Thus, the Chief o f General Staff could be a key factor that drives personnel 
downsizing in military organizations.
2.12.2 National Military Strategy Directive
The National Military Strategy Directive is linked to the national defense strategy 
and the national security strategy (Hesterman, 2014). Any political guidance coming
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through that connection initiates action in real life during the years o f implementation. In
1993, the United States DoD defined its objective as diminishing its active duty force by 
over 446,000 positions (US GAO, 1993): “By the end of FY1993, DoD expects to have 
reduced its active duty force levels by over 446,000 positions, which is a reduction of 
nearly 21 percent over fiscal year 1987's end-strength levels” (US GAO, 1993, p. 0.4.1). 
In 1994, a public law (No. 101-510) established in the United States directed a reduction 
o f over 30% of the United States’ military personnel by 1996 (Cameron, 1998). Based on 
these examples, the National Military Strategy Directive could be another key factor.
2.12.3 Military Expenditure
In most cases, a military organization’s total personnel number, force structure, 
equipment, and weapon systems directly affect military expenditure. For instance, in
1994, the United States estimated a savings o f 40% in military expenditure by reducing 
over 30% of its total active military personnel (Cameron, 1998). In military 
organizations, a reduction in the defense budget generally results in downsizing. As 
Figure 7 shows, the United States’ military expenditures fell from 5.32% to 3.02% of its 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) from 1990 through 1999. During that same period, the 
total number of active duty personnel was reduced by 1.38% (from 2,180,000 to
1,575,000 personnel) (The World Bank, 2014). Thus, military expenditures are thought to 
be a key factor driving personnel downsizing in military organizations.
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Figure 7. The U.S. Military Expenditure (% of GDP)
2.13 Other Possible Key Factors
There might be several other factors that drive personnel downsizing, but this 
study attempts to determine only the most influential factors. Before analyzing other 
possible key factors, it is important to know more about the military organization’s force 
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Figure 8. Force Management Model [Adapted from (Army Force Management
School, 2014)]
In order to meet requirements, solutions are created by using DOTMLPF tools, 
namely Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities. 
To be able to meet the requirements, one or more of the solutions can be used. Possible 
solutions are modifying doctrine modifying the structure or hierarchy of the military 
organization; training personnel; modernizing equipment by buying new warfare systems 
or new IT; educating leaders; downsizing or upsizing the Total Active Duty Personnel 
number; and closing, installing, or enhancing facilities or bases. The National Military 
Strategy Directive and the Chief o f General Staff can directly influence requirements.
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Some requirements may also be created through implementation, capability analysis, and 
gap analysis in military organizations.
2.13.1 Doctrine
Doctrine is defined as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or 
elements thereof guide their actions in support o f national objectives. It is authoritative 
but requires judgment in application” (DoD, 2010, p. 78). National objectives are 
declared through the National Military Strategy Directive; therefore, the NMSD is a 
dominant factor and more influential than the doctrine. As a result, even though the 
doctrine might play a role in downsizing decisions, the National Military Strategy 
Directive is considered more influential.
2.13.2 Organization (Structure / Hierarchy of a Military Organization)
In military organizations, structural or hierarchical changes are common.
However, they are driven by the National Military Strategy Directive, military 
expenditure, or the Chief o f General Staff decisions. One o f those three factors might be a 
trigger to eliminate or to create a structural unit that could lead to personnel downsizing 
or upsizing.
Peacetime positions are called peacetime establishment (PE) (Chairman O f The 
JCOS Instruction, 2013). Positions during crises and war are called crisis establishment 
(CE) (Chairman O f The JCOS Instruction, 2013). Therefore, military organizations may 
position some o f their personnel in new PE posts rather than taking them out o f the 
system.
Military organizations are non-profit governmental organizations. Their mission 
is concerned with fulfilling the requirements for operational readiness and deterrence.
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They have to be ready when their nations need to be defended. In the operational 
readiness system, not all units of the armed forces are expected to be combat ready. There 
might be some units working with only 5% or less of their personnel during peacetime. 
Some o f the units may not even have a handful o f personnel during peacetime. Weapon 
systems are in hibernation mode in customized long-term depots. In case o f a crisis, 
reserves are called for duty, and they get the remaining positions to make the unit 100% 
full in positions. Weapon systems in hibernation mode are also ready to be used by 
reserves where needed. All those actions are guided by the NMSD and ordered or 
approved by the Chief of General Staff. Hence, NMSD and Chief o f General Staff are 
considered to be more influential factors than downsizing in the structure or hierarchy of 
a military organization that drive personnel downsizing in armed forces.
2.13.3 Personnel and Leadership Training
Each military employee has to be trained very well. For instance, in an infantry 
squad, there are nine personnel and the staff sergeant is the squad leader. Each member in 
the squad has to be trained very well. If one o f them is better trained, it does not 
necessarily cause downsizing in the squad personnel number. In military organizations, 
everyone has a certain job description for peacetime (PE -  Peace Establishment) and 
wartime (CE -  Crises Establishment). The squad leader has to know how to use a rifle, 
how to lead the squad, how to use a grenade, and so on. Military personnel are multi­
tasked. The staff sergeant can also work in the office as a staff member in a NATO 
headquarters. Every team member should be as well trained as possible. Military 
organizations work with the philosophy implemented by General Hans Von Seeckt: 
“Train better, fight best” (McLennan, 2012, p. 69).
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When a new warfare system joins the military, personnel that use the new warfare 
system also need additional training. Military organizations have unique specifications 
that are almost impossible to observe in civilian organizations. In a civilian organization 
with better training and expert personnel, it might be possible to reduce some job 
positions; however, in most military organizations, positions are created for a certain role 
to conduct a mission during a crisis or war. Thus, personnel training is not considered a 
key factor that drives downsizing in military organizations.
2.13.4 Material - Modernization, New Warfare Systems, and IT
Modernization and technological innovations such as new warfare systems could 
play a role in personnel downsizing decisions, but this research posits that military 
expenditure is a more influential factor. Modernization efforts are reflected on military 
expenditure. Procurement (16.2% of military budget), research, development, testing, and 
evaluation (11.1% of military budget) phases, which help to create modernized armed 
forces, are included in the United States DoD FY2012 military expenditure (DoD,
2013c). Also, modernization o f the industry has been known to influence downsizing 
decisions (DeWitt, 1998). In addition, in military organizations, buying new warfare 
systems for the purpose o f modernization due to technological improvements might also 
drive personnel downsizing. For example, classic artillery guns required two times more 
personnel than the modem self-propelled artillery guns. The Ml 15, 8 in (203 mm) towed 
howitzer needs a 14-person crew to operate, while the modem Turkish T-l 55 Firtina 
(155-mm self-propelled howitzer) needs only five crew members to operate with better 
precision, a longer range, and a faster firing speed than the previous model (Global 
Security, 2014a; Military Today, 2014). If armed forces decide to use the modem Firtina
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howitzer instead of the towed howitzer, they would need to downsize nine personnel per 
gun. Therefore, buying new warfare systems can affect personnel downsizing. However, 
military expenditure is more influential because it is not possible for a military 
organization to be modernized without expending enough money for new and 
technologically improved warfare systems.
Information technologies (IT) used in military organizations are continually 
improving (Catanio & Catanio, 2010). Military organizations are allocating their 
resources to buy new hardware and software. In addition, they are training their personnel 
to meet the requirements o f the new information technology (Catanio & Catanio, 2010). 
Developments in IT might help improve effectiveness by supporting task completion 
with fewer personnel. On the other hand, the nature o f military missions might require 
additional tasks and personnel. When computers were not so heavily involved in the 
military, it was hard and time-consuming to make changes in policies, procedures, 
documents, and presentations. Therefore, commanders were careful not to give additional 
corrective orders to the staff. As a result of the development and heavy involvement o f IT 
in the military, commanders are very comfortable repeatedly ordering their staff to 
modify documents and presentations. In addition, staff officers working at HQs during 
peacetime are multi-tasking, and they have a role as warriors as well. For civilians and 
contractors, development in IT might be a downsizing factor, but in previous years when 
military organizations were not so heavily involved in the system, there were fewer 
civilians and contractors. In contrast, the development in IT caused more civilian 
personnel involvement in military posts as subject matter experts. In addition, in order to 
have up-to-date IT, software, and hardware, military organizations need a budget.
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Thus, since military expenditure already encompasses investments in 
modernization, new warfare systems, and IT systems, those individual factors will not be 
considered separately in this study.
2.13.5 Personnel (Downsize / Upsize Personnel)
In order to meet the requirements directed by NMSD, the Chief o f General Staff 
uses downsizing or upsizing o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number as one of the 
tools. The purpose o f this study is to investigate the key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing in military organizations. The Total Active Duty Personnel number is the 
dependent variable, and it is affected by the key factors that drive personnel downsizing 
in this study rather than being a factor itself.
2.13.6 Facilities (Close / Install / Enhance Facilities or Bases)
Military organizations need facilities and bases. Driven by the directives from 
NMSD and the Chief o f General Staff, facilities or bases o f a military organization might 
be closed or enhanced, or brand new ones might be installed. After closing facilities or 
bases there might be excess personnel working in the facilities. Depending on the nation 
and situation, the excess personnel might be assigned to another base or facility or remain 
jobless once out of the military organization. Base or facility closure directives come 
through the National Military Strategy Directive and/or the Chief o f General Staff; 
therefore, NMSD and the Chief o f General Staff are considered more influential. As a 
result, facilities (Close / Install / Enhance Facilities / Bases) are not considered to be one 
o f the most influential factors in this study.
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2.13.7 Imitating
Based on socio-cognitive theory, the successful downsizing o f competing 
companies in a sector has been known to influence personnel downsizing in an 
organization (Magan-Diaz & Cespedes-Lorente, 2012). Some organizations are imitating 
the success stories o f others. If the most successful organization declared that the reason 
behind their achievement was personnel downsizing by giving certain data and evidence, 
then some other organizations might try to do the same thing. However, in military 
organizations, every country has its own specific requirements and vulnerabilities. Even 
though one country’s military organization wants to follow the strategy of the top 
military organization, which announced that its increased effectiveness was a result of 
personnel downsizing, it may decide not to perform personnel downsizing. The country 
might refrain from personnel downsizing because of guidance from the country’s 
National Military Strategy Directive and the possible vulnerabilities that could come 
from personnel downsizing. In addition, the Chief o f General Staff might not consider 
imitating more successful examples. Therefore, imitating the success stories o f other 
nations was not chosen as a factor that drives personnel downsizing in this study. 
Contrary to civilian organizations, even though a military organization earned surplus 
personnel during the post-modernization period, due to the nature o f the military 
organizations, it does not lay-off the relatively spare personnel. Military organizations 
have a structure for a possible defense action; however, they cannot fill all o f the 
positions during peacetime.
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2.14 Cultural Clusters of NATO Countries
A cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar cultural characteristics 
(House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this study, 28 NATO countries are grouped according to 
their cultural clusters as displayed in Table 5. Cultural clusters’ groups are named 
Cultural Cluster 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 .
Table 5. Cultural Clusters o f NATO Countries [Adapted from (Chnokar et al.,
2009)]
Cultural Clusters NATO Countries (28 Nations)
1
Anglo
USA, Canada, United Kingdom (3 nations)
2
Germanic Europe Germany, Netherlands (2 nations)
3
Latin Europe
Italy, Spain, Portugal, France (4 nations)
4





Nordic Europe Denmark (1 nation)
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Not listed Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Romania,
Slovak Republic (12 nations)
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The Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) project 
studied 62 nations worldwide (House, 2004). A later study examined 25 o f those 62 
nations (Chnokar et al., 2009). The GLOBE project investigates the cultures by nine 
dimensions including “power distance, performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance, 
assertiveness, humane orientation, future orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional 
collectivism, and gender egalitarianism” (Chnokar et al., 2009, p. 58). However, none of 
the two aforementioned studies included 12 NATO nations, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, 
Romania, and the Slovak Republic.
2.14.1 Modified Cultural Clusters
Further research was conducted to determine whether the aforementioned 12 
nations can be associated to the existing cultural clusters as defined in prior research. 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are considered Nordic countries 
(Chhokar, Brodbeck, & House, 2013). The Nordic Council was founded by Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and Iceland in 1952 (Randburg, 2014). Therefore, Iceland and Norway 
are considered members of the Nordic Europe cluster in this study.
According to Bakacsi, Sandor, Andras, & Viktor, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, 
and Slovenia are considered Central-eastern European countries (2002). Another study 
found that Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and former Yugoslavia are 
considered eastern countries (Hampden-Tumer & Trompenaars, 2000). Yet another 
found that Croatia and Slovenia are former Yugoslav states (Laurent, 2011). In addition, 
the Romanian culture falls under the Central and Eastern Europe cultural cluster (Essays 
UK, 2013c). The Slovak Republic (Slovakia) has been identified with cultural
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characteristics similar to the Czech Republic and Hungary (Essays UK, 2013a).
Therefore, Bulgaria, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Romania are grouped 
under the Eastern Europe cluster in this study.
The Baltic countries are Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which have very similar 
cultures (Bunkse & Tietze, 1994). Latvia is in the Eastern Europe cluster. Therefore, 
Latvia and Estonia are considered a part o f the Eastern Europe cluster.
According to a cultural connection study on social media usage behaviors, the 
Netherlands and Belgium are in the same cultural cluster (Kohl, 2008). Hence, Belgium 
is considered a part of the Germanic Europe cluster. Taking into account its shared 
political, religious, and demographic history, as well as other similarities between 
Luxemburg and in particular Belgium -  such as the same language, traditions, and 
economic structure -  and in view o f a common set of broad values, it can be stated that 
Luxemburg belongs to the same cultural cluster as Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium (e-Luxembourg, 2007). Modified cultural clusters of NATO countries are shown 
in Table 6 .
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Table 6. Modified Cultural Clusters of NATO Countries [Adapted from (Chnokar
et al., 2009)]
Cultural Clusters NATO Countries (28 Nations)
1
Anglo
USA, Canada, United Kingdom (3 nations)
2
Germanic Europe
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg (4 nations)
3
Latin Europe
Italy, Spain, Portugal, France (4 nations)
A Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech
Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Romania, Slovak Republic (13 nations)
5
Middle East Turkey (1 nation)
6
Nordic Europe Denmark, Iceland, Norway (3 nations)
Italics indicate nations that were not originally part of the cultural clusters in the Globe research (House, 
2004).
2.14.2 What Might Change Across Cultural Clusters?
The Chief o f General Staff, the National Military Strategy Directive, and military 
expenditures are considered the most influential key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing across NATO nations’ military organizations. The cultural characteristics of 
a military organization might also affect the decision making process. For instance, in 
one nation, a commander’s decision to downsize might be enough for his subordinates to 
implement the decision, while in another nation subordinates might ask for the rationale
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behind the decision and might look for alignment to the National Military Strategy 
Directive before deciding to obey orders. They might request permission to work on 




This chapter describes the research design and context o f the study. This research 
utilizes a deductive approach through a quantitative research methodology in an effort to 
investigate key factors that might predict personnel downsizing in military organizations 
and whether those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The aim of this 
study was to investigate the relationships between one dependent variable and three 
independent variables by using longitudinal data. The population under study is 
multinational military organizations, and the research was conducted based on a sample 
of 28 NATO nations’ military organizations. Longitudinal data covering a 23-year period 
(1990-2012) was collected from 28 NATO nations’ military organizations (armed 
forces).
The analyses in this study were broken down into two main steps. In the first step 
(overall analyses), an inspection of the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in the 
overall sample o f 28 nations was conducted. In the second step (cultural clusters 
analyses) analyses to investigate whether the key factors differ across cultural clusters 
were performed. Analyses were conducted to determine to what extent the independent 
variables Military Expenditure, turnover in the Chief of General Staff, and modification 
o f the National Military Strategy Directive related to the dependent variable, which is 
Total Active Duty Personnel number. This chapter provides details o f the research design 
and methodology of the study.
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3.1 Research Design and Methodology
The purpose and goal o f this study were accomplished by applying a quantitative 
research design, by collecting data that helped to investigate key factors that drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations, and by determining whether those factors 
differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.1 Research Questions
The research questions that the study addresses were:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military 
organizations of NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
3.1.2 Hypotheses in Null Form
The hypotheses were grounded from previous studies’ findings.
Ho 1: Military Expenditure (% of GDP-Gross Domestic Product) has no relationship with 
personnel downsizing.
Ho2: Turnover in the Chief of General Staff has no relationship with personnel 
downsizing.
Ho3: Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive has no relationship with 
personnel downsizing.
Ho4: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f G D P )  and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H 05: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does 
not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
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Ho6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.3 Hypotheses in Alternative Form
HaI : Military Expenditure (% of GDP) has a statistically significant relationship with 
downsizing.
Ha2: Turnover in the Chief of General Staff has a statistically significant relationship 
with downsizing.
Ha3: Modification of the National Military Strategy Directive has a statistically 
significant relationship with downsizing.
Ha4: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel 
downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ha5: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing 
differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ha6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel 
downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
3.1.4 Population and Rationale
This research considers the overall multinational military organization (NATO) as 
the unit of analysis and NATO as the unit of generalization.
Data was collected for 23 years (1990-2012) annually from all 28 NATO nations. 
Each data point is a line in the data set. For each data point, there are six MS Excel data 
cells as shown in Table 7. There are 23 data points per country. The total number of data 
points in this study is 644. In addition, the cultural cluster associated with the data point 
was also included. There were missing data during certain periods for some o f the NATO
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nations. Missing data which can be summarized by nation and time period as follows: 
Albania 1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991, 
Iceland 1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 1990- 
1992, and Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014).
Table 7. Data Points and MS Excel Data Cells
Total Active Military Tenure of National Military Excel
Duty Expenditure Chief of Strategy Directive Cultural Data
Nation Year Personnel # (% of GDP) General Staff Maturity Cluster Cells
Belgium 1990 110,000 2.3924 1 (Turnover) 1 (Modification) 2 7 cells
Belgium 1991 106,000 2.2895
2 (Second 
year o f duty)
2 (Second year in 
effect)
2 7 cells
Belgium 1992 101,000 2.2240 3 3 2 7 cells
7 cells
United
2012 1,520,100 4.7454 2 1 1 7 cells
States
4508




A data point related to the United States in 2012 is highlighted as a sample in the 
data set. Data points in this study include Nation, Year, Total Active Duty Personnel 
number, Military Expenditure (% of GDP), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive.
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3.2 Data Collection
A variety o f data sources were used for data triangulation. Data related to the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) was mainly 
collected from the Word Bank and S1PR1 (SIPRI, 2013, 2014; The World Bank, 2014). 
Data related to the Chief of General Staff was collected from NATO’s official site and 
the NATO nations’ armed forces official webpages. Data related to the National Military 
Strategy Directive (NMSD) was collected from the National Liaison Representatives 
(NLRs) o f 28 NATO nations working collaboratively with Headquarters Supreme Allied 
Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), NATO’s official site, and the NATO nations’ 
armed forces official webpages. Data related to NATO nations’ cultural clusters was 
mainly collected from the NATO nations’ official webpages and the GLOBE study 
(Chnokar et al., 2009; House, 2004). The lists of the data sources are detailed in the 
appendix.
3.3 Statistical Tool
The Stata 13.1 (Serial number: 301309290450) statistical tool was used in this 
research. Stata offers great possibilities for programming, and it makes it possible to 
perform time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analyses. Stata also makes it 
possible to use the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique 
for this research.
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3.4 Data Analysis Technique
3.4.1 Time Series Cross-Sectional Analysis Technique
This method has been previously suggested as appropriate for longitudinal 
research designs that involve repeated measures taken on the same subject overtime at 
regular intervals (Salkind, 2010).
This study used time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analysis, which 
provides mathematically rigorous theory and techniques. This study uses multivariate 
time series analysis that accounts for a dependent variable (Yt0 and its lagged values (Y(t. 
Di) as well as several independent (Xtj) variables and their lagged values. The research 
data was in a linear time series model for all the dependent and independent variables for 
the period o f 1990-2012. It describes the relationship between dependent variable and 
independent variables with lagged values. Time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data 
is typically characterized by time series data collected at the same time or during the 
same time period for all the dependent and independent variables (Holtz-Eakin, Newey,
& Rosen, 1988).
The time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analyses presented the 
challenge o f analyzing data from different time periods. As shown in Figure 9, there was 
an incomplete data set, including all the indicators over the entire period (Cuevas & 
Quilis, 2012). Hence, analyzing that kind o f data required advanced statistical methods.
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Indicators




Figure 9. Time Series Cross-Sectional Dynamic Panel Data Design
In Figure 9, indicators from 28 NATO nations contain different sections that 
embody cross-sectional data. Each nation can be considered a different panel, and 
collectively the data set can be considered panel data. Since data was collected over 23 
years for each country, it constitutes time series dynamic data. The combination of the 
aforementioned data types created the time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data for 
this study.
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3.4.2 Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments Model and Rationale
In search of a model to analyze time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data, 
different possible statistical models were investigated, and trial runs were performed with 
sample data. As Pollock (2006) states, “Regression analysis produces a statistic, the 
regression coefficient, that estimates the effect o f an independent variable on a dependent 
variable” (p. 137). The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model 
is a regression model used to analyze the causal relationship between dependent and 
independent variables that conform with time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data. 
This statistical method can model both unit heterogeneity (between-subject) and time 
heterogeneity (within-subject) (Alvarez & Arellano, 1998). The Arellano-Bond GMM 
model suggests using a lag o f two or more periods as instruments of estimation in order 
to gain efficiency (Arellano, 2003; Bilgicer, Jedidi, Lehmann, & Neslin, 2014). The 
Arellano-Bond GMM model assumes that there is no serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors but that they are dependent over time periods (Arellano & Bond, 
1991).
One o f the advantages o f using Arellano-Bond GMM in the time series cross- 
sectional dynamic panel data was that the model increased the degrees o f freedom due to 
the higher amount o f individual observations. Another advantage was that the model 
reduced collinearity among explanatory variables, which provided a better estimation 
precision. Another advantage o f the model was the enhancement o f estimator precision 
by eliminating time-variant individual covariates. Yet another advantage was that due to 
the model characteristics, it was possible to investigate heterogeneity by gathering
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information about previous time periods (Ejzykowicz, 2013; Hsiao, 2003; Wooldridge, 
2010 ).
A type o f regression analysis is used to create “a mathematical model that 
adequately described Y  as a function of the X 's, or that predicted Y from the X 's” (Porta, 
2008, p. 53). Correlation and regression analysis are related in the sense that both deal 
with relationships among variables (Porta, 2008). The purpose o f this study was to 
investigate the relationship between personnel downsizing (Y ) and Military Expenditure 
(X|), turnover in Chief of General Staff (X2), and modification o f the National Military 
Strategy Directive (X 3). As a result, the study was particularly suited for the use of a 
multi regression. The initial model was formulated as:
Y = f  (X,, X2, Xj).
This study assessed independence by firstly testing the null hypothesis (H o: p =
0 ) by subtracting the fitted values from the actual values using a regression analysis, and 
secondly by calculating the values o f the autocorrelations among the data points (each 
line point on a data set). The time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data analysis 
formula was applied to the data set using the following equation:
“Yu ~ Xu + pi  +  8 j + e,
Y(t.,n = X (l.,}l + (p, + e i - P i - Bi) + ” (Drukker, 2008, p. 3).
In this equation, (p) and (0) are unknown parameters, (i) is the number of 
independent variables and the equation number in ( t ) year; (Y tj) is the value o f personnel 
downsizing (dependent variable), (Xti) is Military Expenditure, (Xa) is turnover in the 
Chief of General Staff, (Xt3) is modification of the National Military Strategy Directive, 
(e,) is the error term (noise), Y (t-i>i, X(t-i)i and e(t-i),are the values o f (Y ),  (X) and (e), in
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the previous year (t-1). In this case, Y(t.|)„ X(,_i>j and e(t.i)j are called lagged values o f (Y), 
(X) and (e).
To continue the calculations, the A (Delta) (slope) value was needed. The change 
in data was calculated by using the formula A j =  [(X tj) - (X (t.|)j)] /  (X (t-i),)- In the formula, 
A stands for slope of the calculation, (X tj) stands for value o f current year, (X (t. i )l) stands 
for value o f the previous year (lagged value). The slope value may be either positive or 
negative, where a positive value means there is an incline and a negative value means 
there is a decline between current and previous values.
(p) and (9) are unknown parameters that symbolize any unknown correlation, that 
can’t be measured and/or observed. After running the equation by using first lagged 
values of the dependent variable, in (t-1) year:
Y(i-1 )i =  +  (p, + 8 , -  pi - 6  i) +  e n.i),
the unknown parameters (p<; 9 j) are gone.
Y(t-l)i = X (t-l)i + e(t-l)i 
There is still noise (the error term) in the equation. With the assumption that “the 
difference o f the second lag of a dependent variable is strictly exogenous [Strict 
exogeneity requires that (e,*) be unrelated to dependent variable for ( t ) > (t-i)]” (Drukker, 
2908, p. 7) a second value is calculated: “GMM uses lags as instruments to give unbiased 
and consistent estimates o f the coefficients. The first lag equation removes fixed 
household effects and creates variables as instruments to create moments for estimation” 
(Bilgicer et al., 2014, p. 6 ). After calculating the second lag values, the error term (ej) is 
gone.
AiYi = AXi + (eti - e(t-1)i)
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This practice removes unobserved entities as well as bias estimates (Arellano & Bond, 
1991). This model uses lags o f exogenous variables at (t-2) time. GMM estimation 
enhances efficiency by applying deeper lagged values (two or more) to use them as 
instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In order to get unbiased and consistent estimates 
the resulting equation shouldn’t have second or higher order autocorrelation (Bilgicer et 
al„ 2014).
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity tests were performed during the analyses. 
The presence of heteroskedasticity and lack of autocorrelation yields enhanced estimates 
in GMM models(Greene, 2003). Arellano-Bond GMM controls the dependent variable’s 
previous values for the previous years (Arellano & Bond, 1991). When an analysis with 
three lags is performed to assess the dependent variable’s value in (t) time, the GMM 
model can control values in (t-3, t-2, t-1) time. This is a very important estimation 
method used to assess the correlation between the Total Active Duty Personnel number 
(Y) and Military Expenditure (X |), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff (X2), and the 
modification of the National Military Strategy Directive (X3). This is because an 
ascending or descending change in Military Expenditure, a turnover in Chief o f General 
Staff, or a modification in the National Military Strategy Directive in (t-3) time might 
drive an ascending or descending change in the Total Active Duty Personnel number in 
(t-3, t-2, t-1, t, t+1) time and so on (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Analyses were conducted by using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator o f the Arellano-Bond time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data model 
(Arellano, 2003). During the analysis phase, the model was tested for being strictly
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exogenous; this determined whether the data used in this study meets the requirements of 
the Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments model (Drukker, 2008).
3.4.3 Variables, Indicators and Metrics
There are one dependent and three independent variables in this study. The Total 
Active Duty Personnel number was considered the dependent variable. Military 
Expenditure, the Chief o f General Staff, and the National Military Strategy Directive 
were considered independent variables. Year and Nation were considered dummy 
variables. Cultural Clusters was considered a categorical variable.
3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable, Indicator and Metric
Total Active Duty Personnel: The Total Active Duty Personnel number was 
considered the dependent variable. Any reduction in Total Active Duty Personnel 
quantity was considered an indicator o f personnel downsizing, whereas an increase was 
considered upsizing. Total Active Duty Personnel is to show numbers as they were for 
each NATO nations’ armed forces (e.g. 1,520.100).
3.4.3.2 Independent Variables, Indicators and Metrics
Military Expenditure (% of GDP): This variable represents the annual military 
expenditure o f a NATO nation as the percentage o f its GDP (Gross Domestic Product). In 
the data set, military expenditure is to show 14 decimal places (e.g.
1.56352950795231%).
Chief of General Staff: This variable represents the number o f years the Chief of 
General Staff of a NATO nation was on duty. In other words, it is tenure o f the Chief of 
General Staff. The first year of tenure was coded as ‘ 1’, the second year was coded as ‘2 ’, 
and the third year was coded as ‘3’ and so on (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ).
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National Military Strategy Directive (NMSD): This variable represents the 
number of years the National Military Strategy Directive o f a NATO nation was in effect. 
In other words, it is NMSD maturity. The first year of NMSD maturity was coded as * 1’; 
the second year was coded as ‘2’ and so on (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
3.4.3.3 Dummy Variables, Indicators and Metrics:
Year: The years from 1990 through 2012 were considered. Years were coded by 
their number.
Nation: 28 NATO nations were considered. Nations were coded by their name.
3.4.3.4 Categorical Variable, Indicator and Metric:
Cultural Clusters: Cultural clusters were considered a categorical variable. The 
groups o f Cultural Clusters were coded as group ‘ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6’ as shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. Cultural Clusters of NATO Countries by Group Codes [Adapted from
(Chnokar et al., 2009)]
Group Codes NATO Countries (28 Nations)
1 Anglo (USA, Canada, United Kingdom)
2 Germanic Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg)
3 Latin Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, France)
Eastern Europe (Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech
4 Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovak Republic)
5 Middle East (Turkey)
6 Nordic Europe (Denmark, Iceland, Norway)
3.5 Measurement
The data set was created in accordance with the Stata tool requirements. The 
Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model in robust type was 
performed in the Stata by importing data from the data set. The relationship between 
Total Active Duty Personnel and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP), tenure of the Chief 
of General Staff and the National Military Strategy Directive maturity was tested in 
accordance with the hypotheses.
If the slope value o f the change in Total Active Duty Personnel number is 
negative, there is personnel downsizing; if the change is positive, it is considered 
upsizing. When there is active military personnel downsizing and the slope of Military 
Expenditure is negative, it means there is a positive correlation between them. When
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more personnel downsizing occurs as tenure o f the Chief of General Staff increases, it 
means there is a positive correlation between them. When military personnel downsizing 
increases as NMSD maturity does, it means there is a positive correlation between them.
In the overall analyses (Step 1 analyses), data derived from 28 NATO nations was 
used for calculations. When the results were statistically significant, it indicated that the 
related independent variable is a key factor that drives personnel downsizing in military 
organizations.
3.5.1 Measurement for the Cultural Clusters Analyses
In the Cultural Clusters analyses (Step 2 analyses), the same analyses were 
conducted within each o f the Cultural Clusters. Each cluster’s results were compared to 
the output o f the overall analyses (Step 1 analyses), and the difference was investigated to 
determine whether related key factors differed across Cultural Clusters. Operational 
Definitions, Indicators, and Metrics are synthesized in Table 9.
Table 9. Variables, Operational Definitions, Indicators and Metrics





Total Active Duty Personnel is the total number of 
armed forces personnel o f  each NATO nation that 
has “full-time occupation as part o f a military 
organization, including paramilitary forces if the 
training, organization, equipment, and control 
suggest they may be used to support or replace 
regular military forces” (The World Bank, 2014, p. 
1).
Any amount o f reduction in 
Total Active Duty Personnel 
quantity was considered an 
indicator o f personnel 
downsizing.
Three lagged values of Total Active Duty 
Military Personnel were calculated in the 
model. Total Active Duty Personnel number 
is to show numbers as it was for each NATO 




Expenditure (% of 
GDP)
“Military Expenditure is all costs incurred as a 
result of current military activities o f a NATO 
nation” (SIPRI, 2014). Military Expenditure is the 
percentage o f GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of 
each NATO nation.
This variable represents the 
annual Military Expenditure 
o f a NATO nation as the 
percentage o f its GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product).
Two lagged values o f Military Expenditure 
were calculated in the model. Military 




o f General Staff
The Chief of General Staff is the person in 
command / lead o f all the forces in a NATO 
nation’s military organization (DoD, 2010).
This variable represents the 
number o f years the Chief of 
General Staff o f  a NATO 
nation was on duty. In other 
words, it is tenure o f the 
C hief o f  General Staff.
Two lagged values o f the C hief o f General 
Staff were calculated in the model. The first 
year o f  tenure was coded as ‘ 1’, the second 
year was coded as ‘2’, the third year was 
coded as ‘3 ’ and so on. (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).
Table 9. Continued
Independent 
V ariable: National 
Military Strategy 
Directive (NMSD)
The National Military Strategy Directive is an official 
paper for distributing and applying military power to 
attain national security and defense strategy objectives 
(DoD, 2010). NMSD is published periodically. 
Publication periods across NATO countries differ from 
nation to nation (e.g. annually, bi-annually).
Modification o f NMSD 
stands for the year when a 
newer version o f NMSD is 
published. In other words, it 
is NMSD maturity.
Two lagged values o f NMSD were 
calculated in the model. The first 
year o f NM SD maturity was coded 
as ‘ 1 the second year was coded 
as ‘2' and so on. (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6).
C ategorical 
V ariable: Cultural 
Clusters
Cultural cluster is a group o f countries with similar 
cultural characteristics (House, 2004; Russo, 2000). In this 
study, 28 NATO countries are grouped according to their 
cultural clusters.
Data was calculated by 
Cultural Clusters.
Cultural Clusters o f  NATO nations 
were grouped by numbers from ‘ 1 ’ 
through ‘6 ’.
Dum m y V ariable:
Year
Year was considered dummy variable. The years from 1990 through 
2012 were considered.
Years were coded by their number.
Dum m y V ariable:
Nation
Nation was considered dummy variable. 28 NATO nations were 
considered.





The purpose o f this quantitative study was to investigate key factors that drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations of NATO nations and whether or not 
those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This chapter provides details 
of the analyses and findings of the study. The questions for this descriptive research are 
stated below:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military 
organizations o f NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
In order to find the answers to these research questions, analyses were conducted 
in two main steps. For the first step (Step 1: overall analyses), an inspection of the key 
factors that drive personnel downsizing in these NATO nations’ military organizations 
was analyzed. For the second step (Step 2: cultural clusters analyses), whether or not the 
key factors differ across cultural clusters was analyzed.
4.1 Hypotheses in Null Form
The null hypotheses are stated below:
Hoi: Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-Gross Domestic Product) has no relationship with 
personnel downsizing.
Ho2: Turnover in the Chief of General Staff has no relationship with personnel 
downsizing.
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Ho3: Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive has no relationship with 
personnel downsizing.
H04: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ho5: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does 
not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H0 6 : The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses by determining to what extent the 
independent variables Military Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive related to the dependent variable, 
the Total Active Duty Personnel number.
4.2 Data Description
The unit o f analyses was nations’ military organizations. Data was collected for 
23 years (1990-2012) annually, with the size of the panels [N= 28 (28 NATO nations) 
and T= 23 (23 years)]. Each data point (each line in the data set) in this study represented 
Nation, Year, Total Active Duty Personnel number, Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 
turnover in the Chief of General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy 
Directive. Except for grouping and converging some data points under Cultural Clusters 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 , the same data set was used in the Cultural Cluster analyses.
If this study was strongly balanced, it could have a total o f 2576 observations; 
however, due to a lack of data, the number o f total observations was 2423 (only 153 
missing, 5.94%). The number o f observations for Year was 644 (28 nations * 23 years),
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for the Total Active Duty Personnel number it was 621, for Military Expenditure (% of 
GDP) it was 608, for turnover in the Chief o f General Staff it was 622, and for 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive it was 572. The reasons behind 
the missing data were that some NATO nations gained independence after 1990, so there 
were no established armed forces or no recorded data for some nations for a certain 
period o f time. Some o f the missing data by nation and time period were as follows: 
Albania 1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991, 
Iceland 1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 1990- 
1992, and Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014). Iceland had no records o f Active 
Duty Personnel until 1995, and there was no recorded military expenditure until 2009. 
Luxemburg had no records for the national military strategy directive until 2000. The 
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Figure 13. National Military Strategy Directive Maturity by Nation
The tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff changes from nation to nation. In order to 





Figure 14. Tenure of Chief of General Staff Comprehensive Histogram
The National Military Strategy Directive maturity also changes from nation to 
nation. The comprehensive histogram for the 28 NATO nations is displayed in Figure 15.
— —  .
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Figure 15. National Military Strategy Directive Maturity Comprehensive Histogram
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The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) estimation 
(multivariate regression) model was used to analyze the time series cross-sectional 
dynamic panel data in this study (Alvarez & Arellano, 1998). Variables and their defined 
labels in Stata are stated in Table 10. The data set was unbalanced since there were 
missing data for some NATO nations.
Table 10. Variables and Their Stata Labels
Type Variable Name Stata Labels
Dependent Total Active Duty Personnel Totaladp
Independent Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) Mi lex
Independent Chief o f General Staff Chiefogs
Independent National Military Strategy Directive Nmsd
Categorical Cultural Clusters CulturalCls
Dummy Year Year
Dummy Nation Nation
The data set was created by using MS Excel and imported into Stata by coding. A 
sample of the data set used in the analyses is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11. A Sample from Data Set
Nation Year totaladp milex chiefogs nmsd CulturalCIs
Albania 1990 5.88830083200000000 2 4
Albania 1991 1 4
Albania 1992 65000 4.64945888260734000 1 4
Albania 1993 65000 3.19929790315127000 2 4
United
States
2010 1569417 4.84264948610899000 4 3 1
United
States
2011 1520100 4.74543235076344000 1 1 1
United
States
2012 1492200 4.21542916415301000 2 2 1
4.2.1 Pre-estimation Diagnostic Tests
In order to ensure that the data set fits with the requirements of the Arellano-Bond 
GMM model, several pre-estimation diagnostic tests were performed before the analyses. 
Firstly, a random/fixed effect test was performed. Secondly, the Arellano-Bond for zero 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors test was performed to check for
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overidentification that helped to clarify whether variables were correlated with residuals 
or not and to test for the presence o f exogeneity (Roodman, 2009). Thirdly, the White 
heteroskedasticity test was performed to ensure that error terms did not exhibit constant 
variance (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
4.2.1.1 Random Effect / Fixed Effect Test
In order to determine if the data set has Random Effect or Fixed Effect, the 
Random Effect (RE) / Fixed Effect (FE) estimation test was performed. The Random 
Effect estimation assumes that “the variation across entities is random and uncorrelated 
with the predictor or independent variables” (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 25). On the other 
hand, in the Fixed Effect model “each entity is different therefore the entity’s error term 
and the constant (which captures individual characteristics) should not be correlated with 
the others” (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 9). The Random / Fixed Effect Test Results are 
shown in Table 12.
Table 12. Random / Fixed Effect Test Results
Coefficients
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V b-V B))
fixed random Difference S.E.
milex 38457.03 39392.87 -935.8378 266.1941
chiefogs -287.6966 -292.6547 4.958102 25.39243
nmsd 1931.627 1958.296 -26.6688 35.44969
chi2(3) = (b-B)'[( V_b-V_B)A(-1 )](b-B) = 12.38
Prob>chi2 = 0.0062
Note, b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic.
Significant at Prob < 0.05 level.
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The null hypothesis for the test defines the Random Effect as consistent (Torres- 
Reyna, 2007). In Table 12, (Prob > chi2 = 0.0062) means that there was enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that the model is appropriate for the Fixed Effect 
estimation.
4.2.1.2 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test
The Arellano-Bond GMM requires exogeneity, which means unobserved 
instruments should not be correlated with other covariates in the data set (Drukker, 2008). 
The Arellano-Bond GMM model assumes that there is no serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors but does not assume independence over time periods (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). Table 13 displays the Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test results.
Table 13. Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order z Prob > z
1 -2.0733 0.0381
2 .07433 0.9407
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation 
Significant at p < 0.05 level.
In Table 13, it was expected that the first differences in the first row usually reject 
the null hypothesis (Ho = there is no autocorrelation), since the differences include the 
errors (Wooldridge, 2010). The second row was more important since it was designed to 
detect autocorrelation in lagged values. In the second row, the (Prob > z 0.9407) supports 
Ho -  no autocorrelation with a value above the significance level of (Prob < 0.05) 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). The test showed that Hq cannot be rejected (z = 0.07433).
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Therefore, the data set used in this study had no autocorrelation, and it was strictly 
exogenous. The data set met the requirements o f the Arellano-Bond GMM model.
4.2.1.3 White Heteroskedasticity Test
The White Test has a null hypothesis, which states that the variance is constant 
and there is homoskedasticity (Chen, 2003; Greene, 2003). The White Heteroskedasticity 
Test results are shown in Table 14.
Table 14. White Heteroskedasticity Test Results
_______________________________ White's general test statistic______________________________
Number o f obs = 553
F( 3, 549) = 10.78
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3286
_________________________________________________ Root MSE = 2.8e+05_____________
Robust
totaladp Coef. Std. Err.________t_________P>|t|_________[95% Conf. Interval]
milex 200438.8 37338.93 5.37 0.000 127094.1 273783.4
chiefogs 978.1836 6826.96 0.14 0.886 -12431.98 14388.34
nmsd 9907.811 4732.28 2.09 0.037________ 612.2197 19203.4
____________ White's general test statistic : 315.5751 Chi-sq( 9) p-value = 1.3e-62___________
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.________________________________________________________
With respect to heteroskedasticity, the p-value (Prob > F=  0.0001) indicates that 
Ho was rejected. The White Heteroskedasticity Test results showed strong evidence that 
the data was heteroskedastic.
4.3 Step 1: Overall Analyses
The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) one-step difference 
method with robust standard errors was performed in order to test the hypotheses in two
steps: Step 1: Overall Analyses and Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses. Stata 'xtabond' 
estimation was used during the analyses (StataCorp, 2013).
4.3.1 Step 1 Analyses
In Step 1, the data derived from 28 NATO nations was used to analyze the 
relationship between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure 
(% o f GDP), turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, and modification o f the National 
Military Strategy Directive. The first three hypotheses out of the six were tested in this 
step. The results for Step 1 are displayed in Table 15.
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Table 15. Results of Step 1: Overall Analyses
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation_n Number o f obs 458
Time variable : Year Number o f groups 28





(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n) Wald chi2 (27) 6169.16
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Robust Std.
totaladp Coef. Err. z P>W [95% Conf. Interval]
totaladp
LI. .5555217 .0642885 8.64 0.000 .4295184 .6815249
L2. .0645083 .0412745 1.56 0.118 -.0163883 .1454048
L3. .0209928 .037129 0.57 0.572 -.0517787 .0937642
milex
--. 13649.99 8502.788 1.61 0.108 -3015.172 30315.14
LI. 3686.282 5205.689 0.71 0.479 -6516.682 13889.25
L2. -6967.631 4258.892 -1.64 0.102 -15314.91 1379.644
chiefogs
--. -378.5935 861.85 -0.44 0.660 -2067.788 1310.602
LI. 900.1036 811.9682 1.11 0.268 -691.3248 2491.532
L2. -2306.316 1115.754 -2.07 0.039 -4493.154 -119.4789
nmsd
—. 1843.424 484.3892 3.81 0.000 894.0383 2792.809
LI. -622.8125 672.3626 -0.93 0.354 -1940.619 694.9941
L2. 1679.392 783.8299 2.14 0.032 143.1135 3215.67
_IYear_1993 3946.233 8628.54 0.46 0.647 -12965.39 20857.86
Instruments for differenced equation 
GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
The interpretation o f the results is detailed in Table 16. In the table, Only the 
Chief of General Staff (chiefogs) lines were interpreted; the other lines (milex, nmsd) 
were likewise interpreted but not displayed in Table 16. The Total Active Duty Personnel 
number (totaladp) was calculated with three lagged values. LI displays the first lagged 
values, L2 the second, and L3 the third in totaladp lines. Year as a dummy variable
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displays totaladp values, and since it was calculated in three-lagged order, the results 
begin with 1993 where 1990 was the first year of the observations.
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Table 16. Interpretation of the Step 1: Overall Results
Expression Interpretation
Number o f  obs = 458 Total number o f data cell used was 458.
Number o f groups -
Total number o f groups used was 28 NATO nations.
28
Wald chi2 (2 7) = The probability o f results by chance was extremely unlikely.
6169.16
Prob > chi2 =
The probability o f results by chance, in statistical term 0.0000 is assumed
0.0000 as 0.0001.
Degrees o f  freedom
= Waldchi2 (27) = There are 27 pieces o f independent information.
27
Chiefogs L2.Coef = One unit change in Chief o f General Staff drives personnel downsizing
(-2306.316) o f 2306 military personnel for the second lagged calculations.
Chiefogs L2. Robust The robust standard error for the second lagged calculations was
Std. Err. = 1115.754 1115.754.
z-values test the hypothesis that each coefficient was different from zero.
Chiefogs L2.z = - To reject this, the absolute z-value has to be higher than 1.96 (for a 95%
2.07
confidence). The z-value for second lagged calculations was (-2.07).
The relationship between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and
Chiefogs L2. P> \z\ = Chief o f General Staff was significant with a value o f 0.039 for the
0.039 second lagged calculations, where (p < 0.05) rejects the H0. (H0 = There
is no significant relationship).
Chiefogs L2. [95% 95% Confidence Interval was the range o f values with 95% certainty that
Conf. Interval] =
contain the population mean. The range for Chief o f General Staff second
[-4493.154/
-119.4789] lagged calculations was between [-449393.154 and -119.4789],
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4.3.2 Step 1: Overall Hypotheses Test
In order to test the hypothesized relationships between the Total Active Duty 
Personnel number and Military Expenditure, the turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, 
and modification of the National Military Strategy Directive, the Arellano-Bond 
Generalized One Step-Difference Method of Moments technique with robust standard 
errors was performed by using three lagged values (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Table 17 
displays the details from Step 1: Overall hypotheses test results.
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Table 17. Step 1: List of Hypotheses and Summary of Findings
Hypothesis in 




Military Expenditure (% o f GDP- 
Gross Domestic Product) has a 
statistically significant relationship 
with personnel downsizing.
(-6967.631)
One percent change in Military 
Expenditure (% o f GDP) drives 




with a negative 
value
Not Supported
Turnover in Chief o f General Staff
_ has a statistically significant 
HA2
relationship with personnel 
downsizing.
(-2306.316)
A one-year of additional tenure of 
Chief o f General Staff drives 
personnel downsizing o f 2306 
military personnel.
(p = 0.039) 
Significant 
with a negative 
value
Supported
(1679.392) (p = 0.032)
Modification o f the National A one-year of additional maturity Significant
Military Strategy Directive has a in the National Military Strategy with a positive
statistically significant relationship Directive drives personnel value
with personnel downsizing. upsizing o f 1679 military
personnel. Supported
Ha3
Modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive and change in Military 
Expenditure was not found to relate significantly to the Total Active Duty Personnel 
number in the overall analysis of 28 NATO nations from 1990 through 2012. Turnover in 
the Chief of General Staff and modification of the National Military Strategy Directive 
were found to be significant at the 0.05 level. A one-year o f additional tenure of the Chief 
of General Staff drives 2306 active duty personnel downsizing on average, and one year
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of additional maturity in the National Military Strategy Directive drives personnel 
upsizing of 1679 military personnel on average. In light o f these findings, Ho was not 
supported at a 95% level of confidence; there was enough evidence to conclude that 
turnover in the Chief of General Staff was significant with a negative value, and 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive was significant with a positive 
value related to the Total Active Duty Personnel number.
4.3,3 Post-Hoc Tests
4.3.3.1 Interaction Between Independent Variables Tests
Acock (2010) states, “Multicollinearity happens when a combination o f variables 
makes one or more o f the variables largely or completely redundant” (p. 262). 
Multicollinearity occurs when there is a high level of correlation between an independent 
variable and another independent variable or a set of independent variables (Wooldridge, 
2010). The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to assess whether multicollinearity is a 
problem or not for independent variables and, if so, to what extent. VIF is equal to 1/(1- 
R2) (Acock, 2010). The results for the interaction test appear in Table 18.
Table 18. The Results of the VIF Test






If VIF is more than 10 for any variable, there is a multicollinearity problem 
(Acock, 2010). The mean VIF value for independent variables was 1.03, which is less 
than 10, so there was no implicitly high correlation between an independent variable and 
another independent variable or a set o f independent variables. The VIF test results 
displayed no indication of multicollinearity problems. There was enough evidence to 
conclude that there was no interaction between one independent variable and another 
independent variable or a set o f independent variables.
4.3.3.2 Pesaran’s and Frees’ Cross-Sectional Independence Test
In order to test cross-sectional independence (to determine if the residuals are 
correlated across nations), Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional independence tests were 
performed (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). The Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test, 
also called contemporaneous correlation, investigates the presence o f a correlation 
between the residuals and different entities that can yield biased results (Torres-Reyna, 
2007). The data set hosts for (N=28) NATO nations and (T= 23) years. The null 
hypothesis (Ho) is that residuals are not correlated (Ho = cross-sectional independence) 
for (N—* oo) and T  is sufficiently large (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). In order to 
implement the Pesaran cross-sectional dependence test, adequate number o f cross- 
sectional units with common points in time is needed (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006).. The 
test results are displayed in Table 19.
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Table 19. Cross Sectional Independence Test Results
_________Pesaran's Test of Cross Sectional Independence_________
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence = 15.573, Pr = 0.0000
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements = 0.420
 Frees' Test of Cross Sectional Independence________________________
Frees' test o f  cross sectional independence = 1.544
Critical values from Frees' Q distribution 
alpha = 0.10 0.5822
alpha = 0.05 0.8391
____________________alpha = 0.01___________________1.4211_____________________________
Note. Pesaran's Test H0 = cross-sectional independence
Frees' test a  value: Significant at a  < 0.05 level.____________________________________________
The Pesaran’s test strongly rejected the null hypothesis (Ho = cross-sectional 
independence) with the results of (Pr = 0.0001) and an average absolute correlation value 
of 0.420. Results showed enough evidence to assess that there was cross-sectional 
dependence. Therefore, there were enough common units to implement analyses. Frees’ 
test also rejects (for a = 0.05 : 0.8391) the null hypothesis. However, “for small values of 
(T -  23) the normal approximation to the Q distribution is poor” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 
2006, p. 7). On the other hand, for T as large as 30, the approximation does well. There 
was enough evidence to suggest that the model had enough cross-sectional units with 
common points in time to be able to implement the analyses (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 
2006). The Pesaran’s test strongly rejected the null hypothesis (Ho = cross-sectional 
independence) and “rejecting the null hypothesis in all subsets would serve as an 
indication that there is cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances that needs to be 
taken into account” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006, p. 490). In conclusion, there is cross- 
sectional dependence in data and the size o f the panels (N = 28 and T  = 23) demonstrate 
that cross-sectional dependence is not a problem in the study.
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4.3.3.3 R-Squared Test
In this study, the time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data was used. R- 
squared (R2) is the coefficient of determination and shows how much o f the variance of 
the dependent variable is explained by the correlation of independent variables. It is 
between [0 and 1]; the larger the number means the correlation is stronger (Pollock, 
2006). Table 20 shows the results for R2.
Table 20. Results of R 2 Test
Fixed-effects (w ithin) OLS regression
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number o f obs = 553
Group variable: nation n Number o f groups = 28
R-sq: within = 0.1513 Obs per group: min = 4
Between = 0.4225 avg 19.8
overall = 0.3285 max 23
F(3,522) 31.02
corr(u i, Xb) = 0.4989 Prob > F = 0.0000
Robust Std.
total adp Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
milex 38457.03 4004.509 9.60 0.000 [30590.1 46323.96]
chiefogs -287.6966 1723.159 -0.17 0.867 [-3672.876 3097.483]
nmsd 1931.627 1338.45 1.44 0.150 [-697.7834 4561.038]
cons 124301.6 11011.01 11.29 0.000 [102670.3 145932.91
s i g ma u 305331.16
s i g ma e 55490.782
rho .96802675 (fraction o f variance due to u i)
F test that all u i=0: F(27, 522) = 498.34 Prob > F = 0.0000
The overall R-sq (R2) value is 0.3285 meaning approximately 33% of variation in the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number was explained by Military Expenditure, turnover in 
the Chief of General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive. 
The remaining 67% is unexplained by the independent variables. The errors are
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correlated with the independent variables with a value of corr ( u i ,  Xb) = 0.4989. The 
Chief of General Staff (p = 0.867) and the National Military Strategy Directive (p = 
0.150) have significant influence on the Total Active Duty Personnel number. “Sigma u 
is the standard deviation o f residuals within groups ui:sigma_e is the standard deviation 
o f residuals (overall error term) e,'' (Torres-Reyna, 2007, p. 19). In this study, sigma u 
value was 305331.16 and sigma e value was 55490.782. A fraction o f the variance due to 
u i (rho / Pearson's Correlation Coefficient) is also known as the interclass correlation 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007). In this study, the rho value is 0.97, which means that 97% of the 
variance is due to differences across the panels. However, “ In the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the R-squared from an OLS (fixed effect) regression is meaningless’ ’ 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 81). In addition, the R-square measure is not valid for all panel 
data regression techniques (Buse, 1973). Since the dynamic panel data was used in this 
study, R2 test result was not able to justify explicitly how much o f the variation in the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number was explained by Military Expenditure, turnover in 
the Chief of General Staff, and modification of the National Military Strategy Directive.
In order to test goodness-of-fit o f the data set and the Arellano-Bond GMM model a 
series o f tests were performed. First, the Arellano-Bond zero autocorrelation test result 
proved that there is no autocorrelation, and the data set was a good to fit the Arellano- 
Bond GMM model. Second, the data set needed to be heteroskedastic to fit the Arellano- 
Bond GMM model and the White heteroskedasticity test result proved that the data set 
was a good fit with the model. Third, there should be no interaction between one 
independent variable and another independent variable or a set o f independent variables, 
and the VIF test results proved the data set to fit this requirement. Finally, “There must be
enough cross-sectional units with common points in time to be able to implement the 
test” (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006, p. 490). Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional 
independence test proved that the data set had enough cross-sectional units to implement 
the test.
4.4 Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses
In Step 2, the data derived from 28 NATO nations was grouped in accordance 
with NATO nations’ cultural clusters as shown in Table 21.
Table 21. NATO Nations’ Cultural Clusters
CulturalCls CulturalClusters NATO Countries (28 Nations)
1 Anglo USA, Canada, United Kingdom
2 Germanic Europe Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg
3 Latin Europe Italy, Spain, Portugal, France
4 Eastern Europe
Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic
5 Middle East Turkey
6 Nordic Europe Denmark, Iceland, Norway
Step 2 evaluated whether the relationship between the Total Active Duty 
Personnel number and Military Expenditure (% o f GDP), turnover in the Chief of 
General Staff, and modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive differs across
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cultural clusters. The last three hypotheses out of six were tested in Step 2. Hypotheses 
for Step 2: Cultural Clusters analyses in null form are stated below.
4.4.1 Step 2: Cultural Clusters Hypotheses
H04: The relationship between Military Expenditure (% o f GDP) and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
H05: The relationship between the Chief o f General Staff and personnel downsizing does 
not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
Ho6; The relationship between the National Military Strategy Directive and personnel 
downsizing does not differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
4.5 Step 2 Analyses
In order to understand the relationship in the six different Cultural Clusters, each 
cluster was tested individually. Cultural Cluster 1, 2, 3 and 4 had enough data to test the 
hypotheses. However, Cultural Clusters 5 and 6 did not have enough data to run the test. 
Stata xtabond' command cannot execute with that amount o f data. Cluster 5 contains 
only Turkey as a NATO nation, and the data type turns into time series cross-sectional 
dynamic data. Since there was only one nation, there was no panel data specification in 
Cluster 5. Cluster 6 consists o f Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. Iceland had no records of 
Active Duty Personnel until 1995, and there was no recorded military expenditure until 
2009. It was expected that Cluster 6 would have 276 MS Excel data cells to create a 
balanced data set; however, due to missing data, there was only 246 MS Excel data cells. 
In order to estimate the test results for Cultural Cluster 5, 6 ANOVA (Analysis of 
variance), and Tukey's HSD (Honest Significant Difference) tests were performed.
Test results for Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo - USA, Canada, and United Kingdom) 
are displayed in Table 22. The Stata 'xtabond' estimation was able to run for Cultural 
Cluster 1, since there was enough data, and it was still a time series cross-sectional 
dynamic panel data. The number o f observations was 57, and the number o f groups 
(nations) was three. Three lagged values o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number were 
used to observe changes in three consecutive years. Since the Arellano-Bond GMM 
model runs with two lagged values of independent variables to be free from unobserved 
parameters and error terms, milex, chiefogs, and nmsd variables were run with their two 
lagged values.
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Table 22. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation n Number of obs = 57
Time variable : Year Number of groups 3
Number of instruments = 57 Obs per group: min 19
One-step results avg 19
max 19
Wald chi2 (3) = 2.98e+08
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust Std.
Totaladp Coef. Err. z p>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Totaladp
LI. .8172105 .0630378 12.96 0.000 [.6936587 .9407623]
L2. -.3024334 .0577592 -5.24 0.000 [-.4156394 -.1892274
L3. .1817346 .0410879 4.42 0.000 [.1012038 .2622654]
Milex
-5246.058 30105.82 -0.17 0.862 [-64252.37 53760.26]
LI. 79280.59 51395.66 1.54 0.123 [-21453.05 180014.2]
L2. -60678.35 33721.35 -1.80 0.072 [-126771 5414.281]
Chiefogs
-7834.966 4087.043 -1.92 0.055 [-15845.42 175.4903]
LI. -605.4976 2965.388 -0.20 0.838 [-6417.551 5206.555]
L2. -1534.895 1306.054 -1.18 0.240 [-4094.713 1024.924]
Nmsd
1667.653 1362.833 1.22 0.221 [-1003.451 4338.756]
LI. -4411.167 832.2207 -5.30 0.000 [-6042.29 -2780.044]
L2. 3078.029 1018.964 3.02 0.003 [1080.897 5075.1611
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________
In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo -  USA, Canada, and United Kingdom), the National 
Military Strategy Directive proved to be statistically significant (p -  0.03). It was found 
that one-year o f additional maturity in the National Military Strategy Directive drives an 
average 3078 Active Duty Personnel upsizing in this cultural cluster. Military 
Expenditure was not significant ip  = 0.072) with a negative value. The Chief of General 
Staff was not significant (p = 0.240) with a negative value.
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As displayed in Table 23 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value of 0.0895 in Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo).
Table 23. Cultural Cluster 1 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order z Prob > z
1 -1.5096 0.1312
2 -1.6982 0.0895
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation 
Significant at p < 0.05 level.
The test results for Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe - Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Luxemburg) are displayed in Table 24.
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Table 24. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation n Number of obs = 67
Time variable : Year Number of groups 4
Number of instruments = 67 Obs per group: min 10
One-step results avg = 16.75
max 19
Wald chi2 (3) = 425.56
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust Std.
totaladp______ Coef.________Err_________z________p>|z|_______ [95% Conf. Interval]
totaladp
LI. .3327424 .042139 7.90 0.000 [.2501515 .4153333]
L2. .0093578 .0145992 0.64 0.522 [-.0192561 .0379716]
L3. .0789563 .0442532 1.78 0.074 [-.0077783 .165691]
milex
-242040.3 38722.91 -6.25 0.000 [-317935.8 -166144.8]
LI. 220080.8 49143.89 4.48 0.000 [123760.6 316401.1]
L2. -75676.41 64770.1 -1.17 0.243 [-202623.5 51270.66]
chiefogs
238.9902 1252.785 0.19 0.849 [-2216.422 2694.403]
LI. 1544.531 1883.863 0.82 0.412 [-2147.772 5236.834]
L2. -7379.043 2602.25 -2.84 0.005 [-12479.36 -2278.726]
nmsd
6642.279 2813.488 2.36 0.018 [1127.943 12156.61]
LI. -2176.853 2578.506 -0.84 0.399 [-7230.632 2876.925]
L2. -356.8232 235.6388 -1.51 0.130 [-818.6669 105.02041
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________
In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe - Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxemburg) the Chief of General Staff was significant (p = 0.05). It was found that one 
year o f additional tenure of the Chief of General Staff results in, on average, 7329 Active 
Duty Personnel downsizing in this cultural cluster. Military Expenditure was not 
significant (p = 0.243) with a negative value. The National Military Strategy Directive 
was not significant (p = 0.130) with a negative value.
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As displayed in Table 25 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value o f 0.1999 in Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe).
Table 25. Cultural Cluster 2 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order z Prob > z
1 -1.5113 0.1307
2 -1.2818 0.1999
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation 
Significant at p < 0.05 level.
The test results for Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe - Italy, Spain, Portugal, and 
France) are displayed in Table 26.
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Table 26. Test Results for Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nation n 
Time variable : Year 
Number of instruments = 69 
One-step results
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Number of obs = 
Number of groups = 














Err. z NAQ. [95% Conf. Interval]
totaladp
LI. .7363868 .0338695 21.74 0.000 [.6700038 .8027699]
L2. .1888252 .0334795 5.64 0.000 [.1232065 .2544439]
L3. -.1333005 .0364787 -3.65 0.000 [-.2047975 -.0618035]
milex
90157.08 32409.49 2.78 0.005 [26635.65 153678.5]
LI. -90597.82 45198.19 -2.00 0.045 [-179184.7 -2010.989]
L2. 35330.57 16930.96 2.09 0.037 [2146.499 68514.63]
chiefogs
--. 224.151 947.4665 0.24 0.813 [-1632.849 2081.151]
LI. 476.0159 918.4827 0.52 0.604 [-1324.177 2276.209]
L2. -1698.778 988.5652 -1.72 0.086 [-3636.33 238.774]
nmsd
--. 2087.101 749.535 2.78 0.005 [618.0396 3556.163]
LI. -756.451 532.3849 -1.42 0.155 [-1799.906 287.0043]
L2. 93.69936 460.5669 0.20 0.839 [-808.9952 996.3939]
Instruments for differenced equation
____________________________ GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.__________________________
Results suggest that the relationship between Military Expenditure and the Total 
Active Duty Personnel number was significant (p = 0.037) with a negative value in 
Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe - Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France). It was found that a 
one percent change in Military Expenditure results in 35,330 Active Duty Personnel 
upsizing in this cultural cluster. The Chief o f General Staff was not significant {p =
0.086) with a negative value. The National Military Strategy Directive was not significant 
(p  = 0.839) with a positive value.
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As displayed in Table 27, there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value of 0.1634 in Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe).
Table 27. Cultural Cluster 3 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order Z Prob > z
1 -1.8393 0.0659
2 -1.3937 0.1634
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation 
Significant at p < 0.05 level.
Test results for Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece, Hungary, 
Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovak Republic) are displayed in Table 28.
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Table 28. Test Result for Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation
Group variable : nationn 
Time variable : Year 
Number of instruments = 207 
One-step results
(Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on nation n)
Number of obs = 
Number of groups = 














Err. Z p>|zj [95% Conf. Interval!
totaladp
LI. .8582053 .0462585 18.55 0.000 [.7675403 .9488704]
L2. .1089189 .0669068 1.63 0.104 [-.022216 .2400539]
L3. -.189825 .0284155 -6.68 0.000 [-.2455183 -.1341316]
milex
—. 412.7615 3253.354 0.13 0.899 [-5963.696 6789.219]
LI. 5386.039 2211.943 2.43 0.015 [1050.711 9721.367]
L2. -1792.693 2030.217 -0.88 0.377 [-5771.844 2186.459]
chiefogs
~. 753.9073 565.9253 1.33 0.183 [-355.2859 1863.1]
LI. 1189.473 587.4175 2.02 0.043 [38.15557 2340.79]
L2. -564.5364 402.2602 -1.40 0.160 [-1352.952 223.8792]
nmsd
—. 1211.686 618.25 1.96 0.050 [-.0618884 2423.434]
LI. -733.7705 683.0098 -1.07 0.283 [-2072.445 604.9041]
L2. 748.5398 707.6295 1.06 0.290 [-638.3885 2135.4681
Instruments for differenced equation 
GMM-type: L(2/.).totaladp
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovak Republic), there was no significant p  value for any o f the independent variables. 
Military Expenditure was not significant ip = 0.377) with a negative value. The Chief of 
General Staff was not significant (p = 0.160) with a negative value. The National Military 
Strategy Directive was not significant ip = 0.290) with a positive value.
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As displayed in Table 29 there was no autocorrelation in data in the second order
with the value of 0.9925 in Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe).
Table 29. Cultural Cluster 4 Arellano-Bond Zero Autocorrelation Test Results
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors
Order z Prob > z
1 -2.2005 0.0278
2 .00935 0.9925
Note. Ho: no autocorrelation 
Significant at p < 0.05 level.
Since Stata 'xtabond' estimation cannot test Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and 
6 (Nordic Europe) due to missing data, and Cluster 5 for not carrying panel data 
specifications, a series o f comparison tests were performed to investigate any differences 
in Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. In the Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA) technique, “the 
observations are classified according to their categories for each o f the independent 
variables, and the differences between the categories in their mean values on the 
dependent variable are estimated and tested for statistical significance” (Porta, 2008, p. 
6). However, ANOVA cannot point out the differences within the groups with respect to 
each other; it can only specify that two groups are different from each other. In order to 
determine the level o f difference between these two groups, Tukey's HSD (honest 
significant difference) test, as a post-hoc test, was performed (Laerd Statictics, 2013). 
Due to the fact that “Tukey’s HSD uses the difference between the largest and smallest 
means as a measure o f their dispersion; and the number o f groups are used as multipliers 
o f the standard deviation” (Porta, 2008, p. 160); it is a powerful tool to find out the
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strength o f the difference within groups. The Cultural Cluster 5 ANOVA test results for 
Total Active Duty Personnel are depicted in Table 30.
Table 30. Cluster 5 (Middle East) ANOVA Test Results for Totaladp










of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (2.6703e+13) 5 (5.3406e+12) 81.12* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (6.1525e+10) 1 (6.1525e+10) 0.93 0.3341
CulturalCls2 (6.3169e+12) 1 (6.3169e+12) 95.95* 0.0000
CulturalCls3 (2.8541e+12) 1 (2.854 le+12) 43.35* 0.0000
CulturalCls4 (8.1134e+12) 1 (8.1134e+12) 123.24* 0.0000
CulturalCls6 (7.7228e+12) 1 (7.7228e+12) 117.30* 0.0000
CulturalCls5 0 0
Residual (4.0424e+13) 614 (6.5837e+10)
Total (6.7127e+13) 619 (1,0844e+11)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
There was a significant (p = 0.0001) difference between Cultural Cluster 5 and 
Cultural Clusters 2, 3 ,4 , and 6 related to the Total Active Duty Personnel number trends. 
However, there was no significant (p = 0.3341) difference between Cultural Cluster 5 
(Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with an F  value o f 0.93 with regards to the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number.
The Cultural Cluster 6 ANOVA test results for Total Active Duty Personnel are 
depicted in Table 31.
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Table 31. Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) ANOVA Test Results for Totaladp










of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (2.6703e+13) 5 (5.3406e+12) 81.12* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (1.2594e+13) 1 (1.2594e+13) 191.30* 0.0000
CulturalCls2 (3.0356e+l 1) 1 (3.0356e+l 1) 4.61* 0.0322
CulturalCls3 (2.9965e+12) 1 (2.9965e+12) 45.51* 0.0000
CulturalCls4 (1.7379e+l 1) 1 (1.7379e+l1) 2.64 0.1047
CulturalCls5 (7.7228e+12) 1 (7.7228e+12) 117.30* 0.0000
CulturalCls6 0 0
Residual (4.0424e+13) 614 (6.5837e+10)
Total (6.7127e+13) 619 (1.0844e+l1)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
There was a significant difference between Cultural Cluster 6 and Cultural 
Clusters 1, 2, 3, and 5 with p  values under 0.05 in Total Active Duty Personnel number 
trends. However, there was no significant (p = 0.1047) difference between Cultural 
Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with an F  value of 
2.64.
In order to determine the quantity of the difference between Cultural Clusters, 
Tukey's HSD (Honest Significant Difference) test was performed as ANOVA post-hoc, 
and the results for Total Active Duty Personnel are depicted in Table 32.
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Table 32. Tukey’s HSD Test Results for Total Active Duty Personnel
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 614) = 4.0427975
uses harmonic mean sample size = 60.663
grp vs grp group means mean dif HSD-test
1 vs 2 [6.36e+05 1.10e+05] (5.262e+05) 15.9728*
1 vs 3 [6.36e+05 3.02e+05] (3.341e+05) 10.1422*
1 vs 4 [6.36e+05 7.77e+04] (5.581e+05) 16.9418*
1 vs 5 [6.36e+05 6.96e+05] (59721.3768) 1.8128
1 vs 6 [6.36e+05 2.00e+04] (6.159e+05) 18.6951*
2 vs 3 [1.10e+05 3.02e+05] (1.921e+05) 5.8306*
2 vs 4 [1.10e+05 7.77e+04] (31921.3239) 0.9690
2 vs 5 [1.10e+05 6.96e+05] (5.859e+05) 17.7857*
2 vs 6 [1.10e+05 2.00e+04] (89681.3145) 2.7223
3 vs 4 [3.02e+05 7.77e+04] (2.240e+05) 6.7996*
3 vs 5 [3.02e+05 6.96e+05] (3.938e+05) 11.9550*
3 vs 6 [3.02e+05 2.00e+04] (2.818e+05) 8.5529*
4 vs 5 [7.77e+04 6.96e+05] (6.178e+05) 18.7546*
4 vs 6 [7.77e+04 2.00e+04] (57759.9906) 1.7533
5 vs 6 [6.96e+05 2.00e+041 (6.756e+05) 20.5079*
Note. Asterisk **’ means that the difference between two group was significant.
Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was no significant difference between Cultural 
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for Total Active Duty Personnel 
number trend with a value of 1.8128. The asterisk sign means that the difference 
between the two groups was significant. However, there were significant differences 
between Cultural Cluster 5 and Cultural Clusters 2, 3, 4, and 6 for the Total Active Duty 
Personnel number trend. Likewise, there was no significant difference between Cultural 
Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a value of 
1.7533. In order to visualize that there was no difference between Cultural Cluster 1 
(Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) in Total Active Duty Personnel, the Total 

















Figure 16. Total Active Duty Personnel Cultural Cluster 1 vs Cultural Cluster 5
Even though there were some peaks in the values, Cultural Clusters 1 and 5 
showed similar trends in Total Active Duty Personnel numbers.
In order to show that there was no difference between Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic 
Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) in Total Active Duty Personnel, the 
Total Active Duty Personnel trend for Cultural Cluster 6 vs Cultural Cluster 4 is 
displayed in Figure 17.
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Figure 17. Total Active Duty Personnel Cultural Cluster 6 vs Cultural Cluster 4
Cultural Clusters 6 and 4 show similar trends in Total Active Duty Personnel numbers. 
The ANOVA test results for Military Expenditure are depicted in Table 33.
Table 33. ANOVA Test Results for Military Expenditure










of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (120.400683) 5 (24.0801367) 21.06* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (20.875769) 1 (20.875769) 18.26* 0.0000
CulturalCls2 (19.9711206) 1 (19.9711206) 17.47* 0.0000
CulturalCls4 (.530042774) 1 (.530042774) 0.46 0.4962
CulturalCls5 (30.3458736) 1 (30.3458736) 26.54* 0.0000
CulturalCls6 (3.31064764) 1 (3.31064764) 2.90 0.0893
CulturalCls3 0 0
Residual (687.065722) 601 (1.1432042)
Total (807.466406) 606 (1.33245281)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
1 0 8
In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), there was a significant relationship between 
the Total Active Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure (p = 0.037). There was 
a significant difference (p = 0.0001) between Cultural Cluster 3 and Cultural Cluster 5 
(Middle East) for the Military Expenditure trend; also, diversity was very strong with an 
F  value o f 26.54. However, there was no significant (p = 0.0893) difference between 
Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F  value 
of 2.90 regarding Military Expenditure.
Tukey's HSD test results for Military Expenditure are depicted in Table 34.
Table 34. Tukey's HSD Test Results for Military Expenditure
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters 
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 601) = 4.0430747
uses harmonic mean sample size = 58.101
grp vs grp group means mean dif HSD-test
1 vs 2 [2.7171 1.3305] 1.3865 9.8847*
1 vs 3 [2.7171 1.9895] 0.7276 5.1873*
1 vs 4 [2.7171 2.0769] 0.6402 4.5639*
1 vs 5 [2.7171 3.2737] 0.5566 3.9679
1 vs 6 [2.7171 1.6698] 1.0473 7.4664*
2 vs 3 [1.3305 1.9895] 0.6589 4.6973*
2 vs 4 [1.3305 2.0769] 0.7464 5.3208*
2 vs 5 [1.3305 3.2737] 1.9431 13.8526*
2 vs 6 [1.3305 1.6698] 0.3392 2.4183
3 vs 4 [1.9895 2.0769] 0.0875 0.6234
3 vs 5 [1.9895 3.2737] 1.2842 9.1552*
3 vs 6 [1.9895 1.6698] 0.3197 2.2790
4 vs 5 [2.0769 3.2737] 1.1968 8.5318*
4 vs 6 [2.0769 1.6698] 0.4071 2.9025
5 vs 6 [3.2737 1.66981 1.6039 11.4343*
Note. Asterisk "*’ means that the difference between two group was significant.
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Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was a significant difference between Cultural 
Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for the Military 
Expenditure trend with a value of 9.1552. The asterisk sign means that the difference 
between the two groups is significant. However, there was no significant difference 
between Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with a 
value o f 2.2790 for Military Expenditure.
The ANOVA test results for the Chief o f General Staff are depicted in Table 35.
Table 35. ANOVA Test Results for Chief of General Staff










of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (56.8592622) 5 (11.3718524) 5.75* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (32.0916149) 1 (32.0916149) 16.24* 0.0001
CulturalCls3 (23.673913) 1 (23.673913) 11.98* 0.0006
CulturalCIs4 (27.7799823) 1 (27.7799823) 14.06* 0.0002
CulturalCls5 (14.976087) 1 (14.976087) 7.58* 0.0061
CulturalCls6 (.316223647) 1 (.316223647) 0.16 0.6893
CulturalCls2 0 0
Residual (1215.42415) 615 (1.97629943)
Total (1272.28341) 620 (2.05207002)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), there was a significant relationship 
between the Total Active Duty Personnel number and the Chief of General Staff (p  = 
0.05). There was a significant (p = 0.061) difference between Cultural Cluster 2 and 
Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for Chief of General Staff tenure with an F  value of 
7.58. However, there was no significant (p = 0.6893) difference between Cultural Cluster
1 1 0
2 (Germanic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F  value o f 0.16 
with regards to the Chief o f General Staff.
Tukey's HSD test results for the Chief of General Staff are depicted in Table 36.
Table 36. Tukey's HSD Test Results for Chief of General Staff
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters 
studentized range critical value (.05, 6, 615) = 4.0427767
uses harmonic mean sample size = 60.527
grp vs grp group means mean dif HSD-test
1 vs 2 [2.1739 3.0761] 0.9022 4.9927*
1 vs 3 [2.1739 2.3587] 0.1848 1.0226
1 vs 4 [2.1739 2.4433] 0.2693 1.4906
1 vs 5 [2.1739 2.1739] 0.0000 0.0000
1 vs 6 [2.1739 2.9841] 0.8102 4.4838*
2 vs 3 [3.0761 2.3587] 0.7174 3.9701
2 vs 4 [3.0761 2.4433] 0.6328 3.5021
2 vs 5 [3.0761 2.1739] 0.9022 4.9927*
2 vs 6 [3.0761 2.9841] 0.0920 0.5089
3 vs 4 [2.3587 2.4433] 0.0846 0.4680
3 vs 5 [2.3587 2.1739] 0.1848 1.0226
3 vs 6 [2.3587 2.9841] 0.6254 3.4612
4 vs 5 [2.4433 2.1739] 0.2693 1.4906
4 vs 6 [2.4433 2.9841] 0.5409 2.9932
5 vs 6 [2.1739 2.98411 0.8102 4.4838*
Note. Asterisk '* ’ means that the difference between two group was significant.
Tukey’s HSD confirmed that there was a significant difference between Cultural 
Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for Chief o f General 
Staff tenure with a value o f 4.9927. However, there was no significant difference between 
Cultural Cluster 2 and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with a value of 0.5089 related 
to the Chief o f General Staff.
The ANOVA test results for the National Military Strategy Directive are depicted 
in Table 37.
Table 37. ANOVA Test Results for National Military Strategy Directive









Source of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (70.7248473) 5 (14.1449695) 3.20* 0.0073
CulturalCls2 (10.8787998) 1 (10.8787998) 2.46 0.1171
Cu!turalCls3 (.85175607) 1 (.85175607) 0.19 0.6607
CulturalCls4 (8.11003772) 1 (8.11003772) 1.84 0.1759
CulturalCls5 (3.63970588) 1 (3.63970588) 0.82 0.3644
CulturalCls6 (3.70594359) 1 (3.70594359) 0.84 0.3600
CulturalClsl 0 0
Residual (2495.34521) 565 (4.41654019)
Total (2566.07005) 570 (4.50187729)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo), there was a significant relationship between the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number and the National Military Strategy Directive (p -  
0.03). There was no significant (p = 0.3644) difference between Cultural Cluster 1 and 
Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) for National Military Strategy Directive maturity with an 
F  value o f 0.82. In addition, there was no significant (p = 0.36) difference between 
Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) with an F  value of 
0.82 for the National Military Strategy Directive.
Tukey's HSD test results for the National Military Strategy Directive are depicted 
in Table 38.
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Table 38. Tukey's HSD Test Results for National Military Strategy Directive
Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons for variable Clusters 
studentized range critical value (.05,6, 615) = 4.0427767
uses harmonic mean sample size = 60.527
grp vs grp group means mean dif HSD-test
1 vs 2 [3.2353 3.7778] 0.5425 1.9203
1 vs 3 [3.2353 3.0843] 0.1510 0.5344
1 vs 4 [3.2353 2.8465] 0.3888 1.3764
1 vs 5 [3.2353 2.7500] 0.4853 1.7178
1 vs 6 [3.2353 3.5692] 0.3339 1.1821
2 vs 3 [3.7778 3.0843] 0.6934 2.4546
2 vs 4 [3.7778 2.8465] 0.9313 3.2967
2 vs 5 [3.7778 2.7500] 1.0278 3.6381
2 vs 6 [3.7778 3.5692] 0.2085 0.7382
3 vs 4 [3.0843 2.8465] 0.2379 0.8420
3 vs 5 [3.0843 2.7500] 0.3343 1.1835
3 vs 6 [3.0843 3.5692] 0.4849 1.7164
4 vs 5 [2.8465 2.7500] 0.0965 0.3414
4 vs 6 [2.8465 3.5692] 0.7228 2.5585
5 vs 6 [2.7500 3.5692] 0.8192 2.8999
Note. Asterisk **’ means that the difference between two group was significant.
There was enough evidence in Tukey’s HSD test to estimate that there was no 
significant difference in average maturity of national military directive between Cultural 
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) based on the p-value o f 1.7178. In 
addition, there was no significant difference in average for the National Military Strategy 
Directive between Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) 
with a p-value of 1.1821.
In order to show that there was no difference in average maturity o f National 
Military Strategy Directive between Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) and Cultural Cluster 5 












Figure 18. National Military Strategy Directive Cultural Clusters 1 vs 5
In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo), there was a significant relationship between the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number and the National Military Strategy Directive (p = 
0.03). In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), the Chief of General Staff was significant 
(p  = 0.05). In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), Military Expenditure was significant (p = 
0.037). In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe), there was no significant p  value for any of 
the independent variables. In order to better understand the ANOVA & Tukey's HSD test 
results investigating the diversity between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables across Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe), 
overall outputs are depicted in Table 39.
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Table 39. Overall ANOVA & Tukey’s HSD Test Results









Cultural # 3 & Military Expenditure 26.54** 0.0001 9.1552** Yes
Cluster #2 & Chief of General Staff 7.58** 0.0610 4.9927** Yes
5 # 1 & National Military Strategy Directive 0.82 0.3644 1.7178 No
(Middle 
East)
# 1 & Total Active Duty Personnel 0.93 0.3341 1.8128 No
Cultural # 3 & Military Expenditure 2.90 0.0893 2.2790 No
Cluster # 2 & Chief of General Staff 0.16 0.6893 0.5089 No
6 # 1 & National Military Strategy Directive 0.84 0.3600 1.1821 No
(Nordic
Europe)
# 4  & Total Active Duty Personnel 2.64 0.1047 18.6951 No
Note. ** Related variable is significantly different.
Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) 
regarding the National Military Strategy Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel 
number. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 3 
(Latin Europe) related to Military Expenditure. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had 
similar trends to Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) with regards to the Chief of 
General Staff. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 1 
(Anglo) related to the National Military Strategy Directive. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic 
Europe) had similar trends to Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with regards to the 
Total Active Duty Personnel number.
The findings o f Step 2 o f the analyses performed so far lead to further our 
understanding o f differences across cultural clusters. Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) 
Military Expenditure trend in comparison with the other Clusters is displayed in Table 
40.
Table 40. Cultural Cluster 6 Military Expenditure Trend Comparison






= 0. 1491 
= 0. 1420
Partial Sum
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (120.400683) 5 (24.0801367) 21.06* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (31.8004731) 1 (31.8004731) 27.82* 0.0000
CulturalCls2 (3.72761819) 1 (3.72761819) 3.26 0.0715
CulturalCls3 (3.31064764) 1 (3.31064764) 2.90 0.0893
CulturalCls4 (7.03599741) 1 (7.03599741) 6.15 0.0134
CulturalCls5 (40.5260641) 1 (40.5260641) 35.45* 0.0000
CulturalCls6 0 0
Residual (687.065722) 601 (1.1432042)
Total (807.466406) 606 (1.33245281)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
The Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Military Expenditure trend showed 
differences from Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with a p  value of 0.0001, Cultural Cluster 4 
(Eastern Europe) with a p  value o f 0.0001, and Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) with a p  
value of 0.0134.
Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Chief o f General Staff data trend in 
comparison with the other Clusters is displayed in Table 41.
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Table 41. Cultural Cluster 6 Chief of General Staff Data Trend Comparison






= 0. 0447 
= 0. 0369
Partial Sum
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (56.8592622) 5 (11.3718524) 5.75* 0.0000
CulturalClsl (21.6179811) 1 (21.6179811) 10.94* 0.0010
CulturalCls2 (.316223647) 1 (.316223647) 0.16 0.6893
CulturalCIs3 (14.6270231) 1 (14.6270231) 7.40* 0.0067
CulturalCls4 (15.0642541) 1 (15.0642541) 7.62* 0.0059
CulturaICIs5 (11.0603624) 1 (11.0603624) 5.60* 0.0183
CulturalCls6 0 0
Residual (1215.42415) 615 (1.97629943)
Total (1272.28341) 620 (2.05207002)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) Chief of General Staff data trend proved to be 
different from Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) with a p  value o f 0.0067, Cultural 
Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a p  value o f 0.0059, and Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) with 
a p  value o f 0.0010.
Cultural Cluster 6 (Nordic Europe) National Military Strategy Directive data trend 
in comparison with the other clusters is displayed in Table 42.
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Table 42. Cultural Cluster 6 National Military Strategy Directive Data Trend
Comparison










of Squares df Mean Square F Prob > F
Model (70.7248473) 5 (14.1449695) 3.20* 0.0073
CulturalClsl (3.70594359) 1 (3.70594359) 0.84 0.3600
CulturalCls2 (1.56838778) 1 (1.56838778) 0.36 0.5515
CulturalCls3 (8.57081883) 1 (8.57081883) 1.94 0.1641
CulturalCls4 (27.0371883) 1 (27.0371883) 6.12* 0.0136
CulturalCls5 (10.2644796) 1 (10.2644796) 2.32 0.1279
CulturalCls6 0 0
Residual (2495.34521) 565 (4.41654019)
Total (2566.07005) 570 (4.50187729)
Note. Significant at p < 0.05 level.
Cultural Cluster 6 ’s (Nordic Europe) National Military Strategy Directive data 
trend was found to be different from Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe) with a p  value of 
0.0136.
4.5.1 Step 2 Hypotheses Test
In order to test whether the hypothesized relationships between the Total Active 
Duty Personnel number and Military Expenditure, turnover in the Chief of General Staff, 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive differs across NATO nations’ 
cultural clusters, Step 2: Cultural Clusters analyses were performed. Table 43 displays 
details about Step 2: Cultural Clusters hypotheses test results.
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Table 43. Step 2: List of Hypotheses and Summary of Findings
Hypothesis in 
Ha# Alternative Form Coefficient Value
Summary of
Findings
The relationship between 
Military Expenditure (% of 
Ha4 GDP) and personnel downsizing 
differs across NATO nations’ 
cultural clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) (p = 0.037) 
(35330.57) Significant
One percent change in Military with a positive
Expenditure (% of GDP) drives value
personnel upsizing of 35330 military 
personnel. Supported
Ha5
The relationship between Chief 
of General Staff and personnel 
downsizing differs across NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic 
Europe)
(-7379.043)
A one-year of additional tenure of 
Chief of General Staff drives 
personnel downsizing of 7379 
military personnel.





The relationship between the 
National Military Strategy 
Ha6 Directive and personnel
downsizing differs across NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) (p = 0.03)
(3078.029) Significant
A one-year of additional maturity in with a positive 
the National Military Strategy value
Directive drives personnel upsizing 
of 3078 military personnel. Supported
In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe), there was no significant p  value for any of 
the independent variables. Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) and Cultural Cluster 6 
(Nordic Europe) findings were discussed in Chapter 5.
4.6 Validity and Reliability
Validity is the extent to which the measurement and estimation process fits with 
the concept and the purpose of the study (Fawcett & Garity, 2009; Handley, 2014; Last,
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2001). There are two main types of validity. Internal validity determines if the study is 
free from systematic error or bias and to what extent (Porta, 2008). It also determines if 
the construct and the data lead the researcher to accurate conclusions based on the 
relationships being investigated (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). External validity determines 
whether or not the study can be generalized to other populations out o f the scope of the 
present research (Porta, 2008).
Reliability is having dependable results with repeated measurements or 
assessments using the same initial conditions (Handley, 2014; Last, 2001).
4.6.1 Validity
In order to gain validity in this study, a draft version of the research was shared 
with experienced colleagues, and their feedback and suggestions were received. Trial 
runs were conducted to determine if the model was working properly. During the trial 
runs, possible weaknesses o f the research model were tested. The model was modified 
subsequently in accordance with the trial performances. Data was collected for 23 years 
(1990-2012) annually from 28 NATO nations with the size o f the panels (N = 28 and T = 
23) from several data sources. Data triangulation was conducted by verifying data from 
different sources. Analyses were performed with a 95% confidential level and a p  value 
o f 0.05. The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method o f Moments (GMM) model was used to 
analyze causal relationships between dependent and independent variables by using a 
time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data. The Arellano-Bond GMM one-step 
difference method with robust standard errors was performed in order to test the 
hypotheses in two steps: ‘Step 1: Overall Analyses’ and ‘Step 2: Cultural Clusters 
Analyses.’ To ensure that this method was appropriate, a random effect/fixed effect test
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was first performed, and the data proved to fit the fixed effect. Second, the Arellano- 
Bond for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors test was performed to check for 
overidentification that helps to clarify whether variables were correlated with residuals or 
not and to test for the presence o f exogeneity (Roodman, 2009). There was enough 
evidence to conclude that there was no autocorrelation and that independent variables 
were exogenous. Third, the White heteroskedasticity test was performed to ensure that 
error terms did not exhibit constant variance (Arellano & Bond, 1991), and the model 
proved to be heteroskedastic.
The effects o f a change in Military Expenditure, the Chief o f General Staff or the 
National Military Strategy Directive on the Total Active Duty Personnel number of 
NATO nations’ armed forces could be observed in the current year, one year later, two 
years later, three years later, and so on. The mean value for the turnover in the Chief of 
General Staff was 2.54 years, and for the modification NMSD, it was 3.13 years. Hence, 
the lagged values for three (3) years o f the Total Active Duty Personnel number were 
calculated (Hamilton, 2006). The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) model uses two lagged values o f independent variables (Arellano & Bond,
1991). In the first lag, the unobserved parameters were gone. In the second lag, the error 
terms (the noise) were taken out of the equation (Drukker, 2008). Hence, two lagged 
values o f independent variables were used in the study.
With respect to generalization, the methodology o f this study can be used with 




In order to gain reliability in this study, expert (advisors and subject matter 
experts) opinions were received during the whole process. During the analysis phase of 
the study, four statistic experts’ opinions were received, and when they all agreed with 
the calculations and outputs o f the current analyses, the following phases were conducted. 
Triangulation was performed to check data consistency during data collection by 
gathering data from different sources. Even though there was no similar study in military 
contexts, the study methodology was compared with similar civilian studies.
Pre-estimation diagnostic and post-hoc tests were performed to test whether the 
data set and model match. The same tests were conducted to check for output 
consistency. As for the pre-estimation diagnostic tests, a random effect/fixed effect test, 
the Arellano-Bond for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors test and the White 
heteroskedasticity test were conducted to ensure that the data set fit with the requirements 
o f the Arellano-Bond GMM model. As for the post-hoc tests, the interaction between 
independent variables test, the Pesaran’s and Frees’ cross-sectional independence test, 
and the R-squared test were conducted. The Variance Inflation Factor (V1F) test was 
performed to assess whether multicollinearity was a problem or not for independent 
variables and, if so, to what extent. There was no implicitly high correlation between an 




The purpose o f this study was to investigate key factors that drive personnel 
downsizing in military organizations of NATO nations and whether those factors differ 
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This chapter provides details on the conclusions 
o f the study.
The questions for this description are as stated below:
Question 1. What are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military 
organizations of NATO nations?
Question 2. Do those key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters?
To answer the research questions, a series o f analyses were conducted in two 
steps. For the first step (Step 1: overall analyses), an inspection of the key factors that 
drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations was analyzed. For 
the second step (Step 2: cultural clusters analyses), an analysis was performed to 
determine if the key factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
5.1 Step 1: Overall Analyses
Table 44 depicts the results o f Step 1: Overall Analyses.
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Table 44. Step 1: Overall Analyses Results
Hypothesis in 




Military Expenditure (% of 
GDP) has a statistically
Ha 1
significant relationship with 
personnel downsizing.
(-6967.631)
One percent change in Military 
Expenditure (% of GDP) drives 
personnel downsizing of 6967 
military personnel.
(p = 0.102)
Not significant with a 
negative value
Not Supported
Turnover in Chief of (-2306.316) (p = 0.039)
General Staff has a A one-year of additional tenure of Significant with a
Ha2 statistically significant Chief of General Staff drives negative value
relationship with personnel personnel downsizing of 2306
downsizing. military personnel.
Supported
Modification of the National 
Military Strategy Directive 
Ha3 has a statistically significant 
relationship with personnel 
downsizing.
(1679.392)
A one-year of additional maturity 
in the National Military Strategy 
Directive drives personnel 
upsizing of 1679 military 
personnel.
(p = 0.032) 
Significant with a 
positive value
Supported
Turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was found to be significant, and one year 
of additional tenure o f the Chief o f General Staff proved to drive 2306 Active Duty 
Personnel downsizing. This finding showed that turnover in the Chief o f General Staff is 
a key factor that drives personnel downsizing in 28 NATO nations’ military 
organizations. Modification of the National Military Strategy Directive was found to be 
significant; however, one year of additional maturity in the National Military Strategy
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Directive proved to be driving personnel upsizing o f 1679. Hence, it was determined that 
NMSD is not a factor that drives personnel downsizing in military organizations.
Scholars provide evidence o f a relationship between an organization's budget and 
personnel downsizing (Prindle, 2005). According to Gardner (2002), “budgets and 
politics have directly contributed to downsizing decisions o f the Post-Cold War period” 
(p. 41). In 1994, the United States estimated a savings of 40% in military expenditure by 
reducing over 30% of its total active military personnel (Cameron, 1998). The United 
States’ military expenditure fell from 5.59% to 3.02% of its GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) from 1989 through 1999. The total number of active duty personnel declined by 
2.97% (from 2,240,000 to 1,575,000 personnel) during the same period (The World 
Bank, 2014). Likewise, daily newspapers generally relate military personnel downsizing 
with cuts in military expenditure (Chu, 2010, December 5; France-Presse, 2013, 
November 5; Thom & Christopher, 2011, January 7; Times-Herald, 2014, May 2). Even 
though the aforementioned facts point to military expenditure as one o f the key factors 
that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations, when it comes to NATO 
nations, the findings of this study disagree. Military Expenditure (% o f GDP-Gross 
Domestic Product) was found to be statistically non-significant as a factor driving 
personnel downsizing in the study. Contrary to general belief and local findings, when 28 
NATO nations were considered altogether, Military Expenditure was not a factor that 
drives downsizing in military organizations.
All those findings lead the researcher to investigate whether Step 1 ’s results differ 
across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
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5.2 Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses
NATO nations were grouped under cultural clusters with the findings from the 
literature as shown in Table 45.










Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg 
(4 Nations)
3, Latin Europe
Italy, Spain, Portugal, France 
(4 Nations)
Poland, Greece, Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
4, Eastern Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak
Europe Republic
(13 Nations)
5, Middle East T urkey (1 Nation)
6, Nordic Europe Denmark, Iceland, Norway 
(3 Nations)
The same method o f statistical analysis was applied to Cultural Clusters 1, 2, 3, 
and 4. Cultural Cluster 5 (Middle East) only contained Turkey, while Cultural Cluster 6 
(Nordic Europe) included Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. However, Iceland was missing
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data necessary to the use of the model. In other words, from a data perspective, Cultural 
Cluster 6 had only two nations. The model was constructed to measure time-series cross- 
sectional dynamic panel data, and it was not possible to measure Cultural Clusters 5 and 
6 in the model. A series o f comparison tests were performed to investigate the factors that 
drive personnel downsizing in Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. Table 46 depicts the results of 
Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses for Cultural Clusters 1-4.
Table 46. Step 2: Cultural Clusters Analyses Results (CulturalCls 1-4)
h a#
Hypothesis in 
A lternative Form Coefficient Value and Inference




The relationship between 
Military Expenditure (% 
of GDP) and personnel 
downsizing differs across 
NATO nations’ cultural 
clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe) 
(35330.57)
One percent change in Military 
Expenditure (% of GDP) drives 
personnel upsizing of 35330 military 
personnel.
{p = 0.037) 




The relationship between 
Chief of General Staff 
and personnel 
downsizing differs across 
NATO nations’ cultural 
clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) 
(-7379.043)
A one-year of additional tenure of Chief 
of General Staff drives personnel 
downsizing of 7379 military personnel.
(p = 0.005) 
Significant with a 
negative value
Not Supported
(Similar result to 
28 NA TO nations)
Ha6
The relationship between 
the National Military 
Strategy Directive and 
personnel downsizing 
differs across NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters.
In Cultural Cluster 1 (Anglo) 
(3078.029)
A one-year of additional maturity in the 
National Military Strategy Directive 
drives personnel upsizing of 3078 
military personnel.
(p = 0.03) 




In Cultural Cluster 3 (Latin Europe), Military Expenditure had a strong 
relationship with the Total Active Duty Personnel number; however, it did not prove to 
drive personnel downsizing. On the contrary, it proved to be driving personnel upsizing. 
This was more likely to happen if Military Expenditure was rising in Cultural Cluster 3, 
and the Total Active Duty Personnel number was either rising in parallel or not changing 
significantly. In Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe), turnover in the Chief o f General 
Staff was found to be significant, and one year o f additional tenure o f the Chief of 
General Staff drives 7379 active duty personnel downsizing. This finding showed that 
turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was a key factor that drives personnel downsizing 
in Cultural Cluster 2 (Germanic Europe) nations’ military organizations. It yielded 
similar results to Step 1: Overall analyses and means that the Chief o f General Staff as a 
key factor in 28 NATO nations did not differ in the Germanic Europe cluster. In Cultural 
Cluster 1 (Anglo), the National Military Strategy Directive had a strong relationship with 
the Total Active Duty Personnel number; however, it did not drive personnel downsizing. 
On the contrary, it proved to drive personnel upsizing. In Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern 
Europe), there was no significant p  value for any o f the independent variables. One 
potential explanation for the non-existent relationship between the Total Active Duty 
Personnel number and the independent variables was that Cultural Cluster 4 was either 
missing some identifying data or was not homogenous as a different culture. This cluster 
might have some more sub-clusters, or some o f the nations might be members o f other 
Cultural Clusters.
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In order to make an estimation o f Cultural Clusters 5 and 6, ANOVA and Tukey’s 
Honest Significant Difference tests were performed and displayed in Table 47. The aim 
was to find unknown parameters by comparing known parameters.
Table 47. Overall ANOVA & Tukey’s HSD Test Results for Clusters 5 and 6









Cultural # 3 & Military Expenditure 26.54** 0.0001 9.1552** Yes
Cluster # 2 & Chief of General Staff 7.58** 0.0610 4.9927** Yes
5 # 1 & National Military Strategy Directive 0.82 0.3644 1.7178 No
(Middle
East)
# 1 & Total Active Duty Personnel 0.93 0.3341 1.8128 No
Cultural # 3 & Military Expenditure 2.90 0.0893 2.2790 No
Cluster # 2 & Chief of General Staff 0.16 0.6893 0.5089 No
6 # 1 & National Military Strategy Directive 0.84 0.3600 1.1821 No
(Nordic
# 4 & Total Active Duty Personnel 2.64 0.1047 18.6951 No
Note. ** Related variable is significantly different.
It was found that there was no significant difference between Cultural Cluster 5 
(Middle East) and 1 (Anglo) with respect to values o f modification o f the National 
Military Strategy Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel number. However, it did 
not necessarily mean that the relationship between the National Military Strategy 
Directive and the Total Active Duty Personnel number was almost identical in Cultural 
Cluster 1 (Anglo) and 5 (Middle East).
The Total Active Duty Personnel trend was very similar for Cultural Cluster 6 
(Nordic Europe) and Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe). Cultural Cluster 6 was a
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divergent cluster because its Military Expenditure trend was similar to Cluster 3 (Latin 
Europe), its trend for turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was similar to Cluster 2 
(Germanic Europe), and its trend for modification of the National Military Strategy 
Directive was similar to Cluster 1 (Anglo). However, Cultural Cluster 6 Total Active 
Duty Personnel trend was found to be different from Cultural Clusters 2, 3, 1 and 5. The 
Cultural Cluster 6 Military Expenditure trend differs from Cultural Clusters 1,4, and 5. It 
was anticipated that the Cultural Cluster 6 Chief o f General Staff trend would differ from 
Cultural Clusters 3, 4, and 1. It was predicted that the Cultural Cluster 6 National Military 
Strategy Directive trend would differ from Cultural Cluster 4. Most likely, those results 
were related to the amount of missing data. It was not possible to estimate which Cultural 
Cluster was characteristically similar to Cultural Cluster 6. In conclusion, Cultural 
Cluster 6 test results proved that Cultural Cluster 6 was different from 28 NATO nations.
There was enough evidence to conclude that the relationship between Military 
Expenditure, turnover in the Chief o f General Staff, modification o f the National Military 
Strategy Directive, and personnel downsizing differs across NATO nations’ cultural 
clusters.
5.3 Conclusion
It was found that turnover in the Chief o f General Staff was a key factor that 
drives personnel downsizing in 28 NATO nations’ armed forces. In contrast, 
modification o f the National Military Strategy Directive was a key factor that drives 
personnel upsizing. On the other hand, reduction in Military Expenditure was generally 
declared the reason for military personnel downsizing. In this study, it was found that 
Military Expenditure was not a factor that drives Active Duty Personnel downsizing;
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instead, the Chief of General Staff was found to be the key player. Military expenditure 
might have been used as justification for the Chief o f General S taffs downsizing 
decisions.
This study showed that the main player in Active Duty Personnel downsizing 
implementation is the Chief of General Staff, neither Military Expenditure, nor NMSD. 
Even though Military Expenditure can drive a military organization to downsize, the 
Chief of General Staff can delay or cancel the actual implementation. Even though there 
seems to be a sufficient Military Budget to hold all Active Duty Personnel for a certain 
period o f time, a Chief o f General Staff may also decide to downsize for other reasons. 
However, all these inferences are subject to change when applied to different Cultural 
Clusters of NATO nations. The analysis results o f Step 1 of this study looked at the 
overall NATO group as a whole. However, in one culture, when a Chief of General Staff 
directs his command to perform personnel downsizing of the Total Active Duty 
Personnel number, his / her staff may obey the rules and work very hard to meet the 
commander’s order as soon as possible. Inversely, in another culture, the staff may 
request to know the rationale o f the personnel downsizing order before implementing the 
directive. The staff may request to work on possible risks, mitigations, and opportunities. 
In the end, they may either support or not support the Chief o f General S taffs decision 
by providing detailed rationale. To conclude, it was found that the key factors that drive 
personnel downsizing differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters.
The National Military Strategy Directive might reflect the ideal defense power 
that a nation desires to have; however, the Chief o f General Staff, when faced with the 
realities o f defense planning with limited resources including personnel and budget,
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might act differently. That might be the reason why NMSD is a key factor in triggering 
personnel upsizing rather than downsizing. The Chief o f General Staff might need to find 
a rationale for personnel downsizing decisions in order not to be blamed for layoffs and 
might use a declining military budget as justification for personnel downsizing. In 
agreement with this view, Scott (1998) anticipated that some firms might use poor 
economic conditions as a rationale for closing unsatisfactory divisions o f the 
organization. In this study, it was found that Chief o f General Staff is the key factor 
driving personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations. On the 
contrary, the news frequently declares that due to the declining military budget the armed 
forces are performing layoffs. For instance, according to an article in the Los Angeles 
Times, “There's little doubt that the spending cuts will downgrade armies and arsenals, 
which could cause a strain on the United States" (Chu, 2010, December 5, p. 1). 
According to an article from Agence Presse, “America will need to scale back the size of 
its armed forces in the face of deep budget cuts” (France-Presse, 2013, November 5, p.
1). Yet another article from the New York Times expresses that “The White House has 
told the Pentagon to squeeze that growth in the next five years, Gates said, reducing by 
$78 billion the amount available for the Pentagon, as a result of this the Army is expected 
in 2015 to begin cutting its active-duty troop levels by 27,000, and the Marine Corps by 
up to 20,000” (Thom & Christopher, 2011, January 7, p. 4). However, in this study it is 
found that Military Expenditure is not a significant factor that drives personnel 
downsizing in military organizations. Therefore, the findings in this study support the 




There are a few studies on military downsizing, but none o f them investigated key 
factors that drive personnel downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations and 
whether or not those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. This time 
series cross-sectional dynamic panel data study was the first of its kind to investigate the 
relationship between the Active Duty Military Personnel number and Military 
Expenditure, tenure of the Chief of General Staff, and the National Military Strategy 
Directive maturity. This study was a unique example in military settings, and it may 
encourage researchers to work on the factors that drive downsizing in bases, facilities, 
hierarchical organizations, work processes, weapon systems, and equipment in military 
settings. The methodology used in this military setting was unique, and it can be easily 
implemented in civilian settings. This study contributed to our understanding o f a number 
of key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations o f NATO nations 
and whether or not those factors differ across NATO nations’ cultural clusters. The 
findings from this research contribute to the discipline o f engineering management by 
providing a model to improve our understanding and ability to predict future personnel 
downsizing decisions and to increase our understanding of military governance not only 
NATO wide but also worldwide. The findings may also set off a series of publicly shared 
military downsizing studies. Cultural diversity was found to affect the decision making 
process in military downsizing. Findings on cultural diversity make this study more 
significant. Researchers from other nations can repeat this study by using their own data 
to investigate what lies behind military downsizing in their regions and organizations.
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This study filled a gap in the literature about the factors that drive personnel 
downsizing in military organizations and how they differ across cultural clusters. In 
addition, there was no previous study on how influential factors may differ across NATO 
nations’ cultural clusters. This study relied on prior literature on cultural differences to 
assign 12 NATO nations to existing cultural clusters since those nations were not 
included in the GLOBE study (Chnokar et al., 2009). The modification o f NATO nations’ 
cultural clusters may encourage researchers to update the GLOBE findings by adding 
missing NATO nations. The same methodology can be used in civilian settings in 
different business disciplines using time series cross-sectional dynamic panel data. The 
study showed that NATO nations in Cultural Cluster 4 (Eastern Europe - Poland, Greece, 
Hungary, Albania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic) may need to be further explored to investigate 
whether some o f the nations were culturally similar to other cultural clusters or if there 
were other sub-cultural clusters among Cultural Cluster 4 nations.
Since this study found the Chief o f General Staff to be the key factor that drives 
downsizing in NATO nations’ armed forces, it might also mean that the main factor in 
military organizations is human. Whatever the organization is, whatever the 
organizational strategy guides, it is up to us, human beings, to decide when and what to 
do when it comes to personnel downsizing. In order to better understand personnel 
downsizing decisions, it is critical to identify the most significant factor that affects final 
decision. One of the key factors in personnel downsizing decisions might be to influence 
the CEO or the Chief o f General Staff for the ones who seek to get the desired results for 
personnel downsizing decisions.
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This study also proved that NATO clusters differ with respect to the approach 
they take to downsizing decisions. The drivers o f downsizing decisions were different 
across NATO cultural clusters.
Military culture can be also seen as coexisting with national culture and creating a 
different subculture within the overall national population. One of the reasons might be 
that NATO as an organization forms a culture o f its own, and the national personnel 
experienced in NATO might have reached a level o f mutual understanding, sharing 
values and beliefs with other NATO nations’ military personnel. The purposes, goals, 
training methods, and decision-making processes might be similar enough to create a 
NATO culture among NATO nations’ armed forces.
5.5 Limitations of the Study
There are no previous studies that specifically search for the factors that drive 
personnel downsizing in military organizations. The data and analysis methods used in 
the research design are limited in certain areas. With respect to data, there was some 
missing data because some NATO nations gained independence after 1990, and there 
were no established armed forces or recorded data for some of the NATO nations for a 
certain period o f time. Some of the missing data by nation and year is as follows: Albania 
1990-1991, Croatia 1990-1991, Czech Republic 1990-1992, Estonia 1990-1991, Iceland 
1990-1994, Latvia 1990-1992, Lithuania 1990-1992, Slovak Republic 1990-1992, and 
Slovenia 1990-1991 (The World Bank, 2014). With respect to the analyses, the study 
focused on quantitative indicators for the most influential factors as identified in the 
previous literature. Qualitative factors and less influential factors were out o f the scope o f 
this study for feasibility purposes. Downsizing in NATO nations’ armed forces is a
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highly complex phenomenon, and it is hard to find out what really lies behind 
downsizing. The Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) cannot run 
with relatively little or missing data (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This is the reason why it 
was not possible to identify the factors for Cultural Clusters 5 and 6. Originally, 12 
NATO nations were not a part o f the GLOBE study with respect to Cultural Clusters. It 
was possible to include missing nations in groups by researching relationships. However, 
an educated assumption had to be made by considering the modified Cultural Clusters in 
this study. Three lagged values o f Total Active Duty Personnel were calculated in the 
model.
Strategies o f downsizing, types o f downsizing, the management o f a downsizing 
process, the decision making process o f downsizing, the pros and cons o f downsizing, the 
question of whether or not downsizing is good or bad for the health o f an organization, 
the question o f whether an organization should downsize or not, rightsizing o f an 
organization, the risks o f downsizing, the causes o f downsizing, and the effects of 
downsizing were out o f the scope o f this study since they were not directly related to the 
investigation of the key factors that drive personnel downsizing in military organizations. 
Hence, literature on the aforementioned areas was not reviewed in this study.
Data was collected from 28 NATO countries between the years o f 1990-2012 (a 
span of 23 years) to work specifically on these countries. To maintain the feasibility of 
this study, the number of years devoted to research was limited to 23. Other possibly 
related populations were not considered because it was not feasible to work on all o f the 
countries around the world fo ra  limitless period o f time. National Instability can be 
defined as the fluctuation or irregularity o f a NATO nation before, after, or during a war,
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crisis, military operation, or an extreme event such as joining NATO (Future Atlas,
2014). During National Instability periods, the Total Active Military Personnel number 
and Military Expenditure o f a NATO nation might fluctuate and affect the data. The 
possible effects of National Instability periods on the data were not taken into 
consideration because data for this variable were not available.
S.6 Suggestions for Further Research
The same methodology used in this study could be applied in different ways.
First, it could be applied to different armed forces and different cultural clusters to 
understand the effects of cultural diversity on military personnel downsizing actions. 
Second, it could be used in civilian settings in different business disciplines to determine 
whether CEOs are the key factors that drive personnel downsizing. Finally, the same 
methodology used in this study could be applied to qualitative and less influential factors 
(e.g. downsizing in hierarchical structure, closing facilities or bases, training, 
developments in information technologies, buying new warfare systems or 
modernization) that could drive personnel downsizing.
With respect to cultural clusters, further research needs to be conducted. This 
study made an assumption by locating into suitable Cultural Clusters 12 NATO nations 
that were not covered in the GLOBE study. First, a study to update the GLOBE findings 
by adding missing NATO nations needs to be conducted. Second, a subculture study 
considering NATO nations’ military personnel culture could be performed. Finally, with 
a motto o f ‘cultural transformation’, an investigation to determine if any nation from the 
current GLOBE findings moved to another cultural cluster could be performed.
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The key factors that drive decisions about military units, equipment, weapon 
systems, or facilities and bases downsizing in NATO nations’ military organizations, and 
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